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INTRODUCTION
The Purpose of the Thesis

---,~~~.

The purpose of this paper is to report on the results

of reseafch

~f the United States Office of Censorship from

the birth of that office in 194-1 to its timely death in 1945,
Jim Heath, in his article, "Domestic America during
World War II: RfJsearch Opportunities for Historians," 1 pro-

vided the impetus for the
paper~

Profe~sso!'

rese~u:'ch

that has resulted in thh:

Heath sta·tes that rnost histories of World

"'
1·1· h ave r2 ...·: eg;;;:teo.
. " ·~;'h e .I:mer1.can
'
.
t'
••ar ....
oomes
·J.c scene t .o a

secondary plaee .Ln the process of reporting on the more
')

exciting d:i.plo1:1at.ic &md military aspects o:f the period,'·

He

suggests that historians analyze the various published

histories of' the many short.,lived bureaucratic offices
necossitated by the contingencies of World Viar II.

these offices v1as the

U~

S~

One of

Office of Ce11sorship.

In repox·ting on thfJ aetivi ties of the Office of
Gcnson:hip -this paper will diBeuss the goverTm;ent program;;

1Jim F~ HeE~th~ t~Domes·tic America during World War II:
Resc.;n·ch Opnortuni.ties for Historians," The Journal of
!:EeE~h~:'!-E:.!l~-:.''o~Q.J:.:i, J,V III (September, 19'71)-, ~"j1l1.f"".::Lf11f:--··

1.

2

of compulsory and volunts.ry censorship, how they sometimes
conflicted and overlapped, and how they stood up against
military

CE:nr~Ol'llhip.

In chapter VI an appraisal will be

made of the censorship program and its Director, Byron Price.
Problems and IJ.mi
tations
..

--·--··-'"~-"~--b-

~--..·---~~---~·~-

1'he greatelJt problem encountered in researching the
activities of the Of:fico of Censorship involved the avail··
ability of official United States Government records and
documents,

l

'l'he official -~--..~,<---·
Records of
the Office of Censorship
-----~··-·~-~----·-""~---"-...----=·........_·

are desc:dbed in brief sLrmmary form in

J1o_~_,2!!> published

prcl]J!I::~l}§l.l'Y:__IQ.Y:~Irt;_oq

by the National A:cch:Lves,J

The Nat:Lonal

Archives x·eta:i.m,, the onJ.;</ copic's o:f these documents which
collect.i.ve:ly G.mc.unt to more than fi\rc hundred cubic feet of
inf'orm:;;.t:l.on,

'f'l1e vast majority of these documents is ei thG:r

closed by Presidential Order or, in tho case of certain
documents, available only to", • , those agencies of the
Federal Government that have a legitimate interest i..n the
1
information , . . " they conta.in. + 'rhe Preliminary Inventory
of thesE! records lists thirty .. onc separate files, reports,
:i.ndexet; t rec:orclings, budget estimates,

books, memoranda, radio watch-logs, and

ledgers~
oth(~I'

telet:ypes ~

mir;collaneous

.3
·_of

.Q.~n<':?r9hi:e,

19Lf1-.4·.'?. ( 7 vols.), is available for study,

and that one only at high cost,5
There are, however, a numher of documents, or copies

of documents, contained in the Defense Collection o:f the
University of CaliJo:r-nia at Berkeley.

'l'hese include an

official report on the Office Of Censorship, a collection of
office~

press releases by that

a:nd copJ. c::-3 c:f the v.rartime

- -- ------- -- --- ------ r:.
censorship codeS:·.....- --,J!he sci docu.rnenl;n eompJ:··ise -the backbone- o-f

this paper,
There are only two secondary

S 1JlJ.:t:'cc_;s

deal

Yf!::'!:l22.D""?.L.i3..:P.~~9.~_7

directl;,r with the Office of Censorship,
was written by Theodore

..Ghat

1". Koop, former Assi.st:imt Direetor
In hh: bc;ok, Koop provid("" an

of the Office o:f Censorshii',

overall view of the duties and activities of the offi0e, but
he ignore.s or glosses over much cri t1ci.~nn of tb-e voluntary

censorship :program,

Koop is critical, hovwvor, of the

efforts of military censors, who often acted in direct con-

"
.:;The
cost of a negative microfilm copy of these sevE'n
volumes (!WOO pager.;) is $1.fOO; Jane F. Smith, Acting Di!:eetor,
Civil Archives Division of the Nation8l Archives <:mel Recm.ds
Service, to writer, November 11., 197:\.
6
Historical Re:r!Orts on War AdminJ rstn,,tion, fL)l"?J?.gE:~
5!.!}~__:tlJt...~9~:£.:fJ~~~~~~:f_.,g~~~~..£.~E~t~~~E (Wa:=:hi:rtgton,- D,G~-~ U~ s. Gov·8:rnrtJ'"Y''i' T•r:tntJ.'nn Q+'·>···['"'8>
·l·o"JJ
"'t'e
,.,,'(>c•c• Y•Al,,,,,SC'S <>l'n ·['Ol'lld
7 r.";) o
J..l..
<
in a s:ir1gle volume under the ti tlc-~, U S, C_iff'ice of CensoJ>·
s bJl~!~_y· r.5: s ?~B..~~~~-~l~~~--.-1::§"§
Th 1 s v u runic;-~-r.s~·illi~r:·;::i~.~-a. -:t:iTJI~~---·<:; :e
,_..

i.

'·

.•

1

C>

.J..J,.,,__,

~

)~·'· ~~·''-'·

•

···'<~·"-'-· C·.•- ·-"'

......,_,

Y

•

-

c

f

conte:n.tc

~

Tf1e fJ..:f.'teen -c-ensorshi11 codes are

of'

n::_~i:H;~mblcd.

in a

single volurne by 'the University
Cal:Lforn:lo. librco.rv tcl.'.dor
the title, Un.i ted States Office of Censon:hi.J:,: lVJic_:(;'"'l.l::tncous

1 L"l·:·l-;;--:-t·~~·'t·J ·L·e···-·o--1~'·-c7'o...n.":-'t·.,-;·,~·:·,,c·;~·--J:·'"o·~~·-·:r l;··J, ·:;-·.........
~" ·1: 1'. or1 •·s:·-(-11'iF'2-::To"l:}iiT···---..
l) -u'·)I. 1 •'t. '--'·-·
• 7..,
···7 -:..d.J a
•
v·oTuDJe.....rs-·1nacc'Li:i.~al..8arid LLJ .... axrangcd.
~.
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~>.)

• • .1-.

•• _ .. -, ...

4
flict with the Office of Censorship,

~ti.n}e_Qgnsorsl~p~9.f

Press and Radio, by Robert E. Summers, 8 is helpful because
it documents much of the criticism leveled by journalists on
the Office of Censorship during the earl;y- months of the war.

As stated above, the documents of the· O:Cfi.ceJ of
-

-

C_ensors)1i.p :form the backl;Jone of this paper.

~:hese

documents

provided a starting point from which certain persons,
incidents, regl<lations, and concepts could be f'urtllfn'
investigated,

In addition to theseavailable documents and

the two boolcs cited above, the next most productive sources
'

1

of information were the many periodicals published during
the

w<~.r.

It is in these periodicalf: that one finds the bvlk

of cri t:i.cism toward compulsory and voluntal'Y censorship.
The writer attempted to con:espond with a.s many
f'ormer Censorship officials as couJd be located more than
tvienty-five yea:r.s after the Office of Censorship cc;,ased to
function,

The number of responses to these inqv.ir:i.f:s was

encouraging,

1'he quality of one particular response con-

tributecl immeasurably to the resflarch,

Byron Price, the

former Director of the Office of Censorship, later Assistant
Secretary-General of' the United Nations (19LV(--:lC))!f), provided prompt, willing, and able assistance at his ov,n
expense and on his own time.

5
The research strategy, then, involved studying govern··
ment documents, and a kind of reconnaissance patrol throvgh
many secondary sources.

The periodicals of the period pro-

vided the main arsenal of ammunition for the scattered
attacks of critic ism on government censorship.

1'he corres-

pondence with Byron Price 2.nd the interviews w:i.th Norman
Carlson and lVi.e lvin Jacobus were a si.gniL\.cant breakthrough
in the blockaded lines of official information.
The Office of Censorship fought World war II on a
home-front battlefield that often extended beyond the shores
of the United States and onto the high seas.

'rhe army

enliGted by the Office of Censorship included both willing
and reluctant roc•ldiers
and r;o,cUo.

the members of the American press

The battles they fought always had two goalst

the deJ'eat of the enemy and tho preservation of democratic
freedoms.

As was bound to happen, there were times when one

goal had to be achieved at the expense of the other.

The

battles fought by this army in the war on words were sometimes small and sometimes la.rge.

They were never dull,

though there were times when some persons quefot:Loned the
strategic value of some of the battles.
that story.

This paper tells

II

THE CALL TO ARMS
Formation of the Office of Censorship
On the morning of December '?, 19Li·l, Japan attacked
the United- States at Pearl Harbor.

Just one hour after

th<~

Sunday morning attack the United States began censoring all
telegraph, cable, and radiotelephone messages between Hawaii
and the United States.

Within a week Army censors were

opening letters that passed to and from the United Str;.ter;
and tl'1e H.8}Naiial'.l Islands e t
The ability of tho United

Sta.t~3s

GoverrmJent to aet

H.s

quickly as it did in censorship operations came as a result
of planning for wartime censorship that went back more than
two years.

As early as September, 1939, the U. S. Navy was

formulating plans for censorship operations.

:Sy August,

19Li·1, the U. S. Army was conducting a censorship education
program for a small number of its of.'ficers.

~~he

personnel

trained by these two military branches were able to begin
nominal censorship of postal and cable cormnunica tions
crossing the borders of the United States soon after the

6

7
Japanese aerial attacl1: on Pearl Harbor, 2

On December 8,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked J, Edgar Hoover,
Director of' the Federal Bureau of' Investigation, to take
temporary charge of' all phases of censorship.3

Thus, even

before the Office of Censorship was born, military censors
were conducting survc"illance of all types of communications
to and from the United States.
On December l8, 191H, Congress passed the First War
Powers Act which gave the President the power to conduct the
censorship of all", . • mail, cable, radio, or other means
of transmission passing between the United States and a:ny
.

.f ore1.gn country:

1

u

4 'I'his Act also declared that any p0r'::iOll

convicted. of evading censorship wou.ld be subject to "ten
years inrprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both.

There were

those who would, before censorshl:p ended i.n l9Lf5, suffer the
full force of this penalty,

Based upon the powel.'s granted

him in the First War Powers Act, President Roosevelt, on
December 1.9, issued an Executive Order formally establishing
the Office of Censorshi.p.5

As Director of this office the

President appointed Byron Price, formerly Executive Editor
and General 1\lanagel" of the Associated Press.

Price, born to

farming pBTents in Indiana i.n 1891, had, after college,
2 r·

.

. 01. d •

3r·
·1
_13~~

9

p.

4.

4
Firut War Powers Act, Section 303, 55 Stat. 8J8,
December 18, 194·1; quoted in ibid,
5Executive Or<ler 8985, December 19, 191+1 ( 6FR6625).

8

By 1937 he
had risen to the top position in that organization. 6

become a correspondent for the

Associate~

Press.

Roosevelt's choice of Byron Price as the man who would soon
be directing others to listen in on private telephone conversations and read the mail of law-abiding, patriotic .American
citizens was, as it turned out, a wise one.

Journalists

usually acquire an occupational distaste for any form of
speec-h and the--

press are seldom more intensely recognized or supported than
they are by .Ameriean newspapermen.

To place as Director of

Censorship another person, such as one who looked with favor
oi1 censorship, could have created a totalitarian danger that
the count17 could ill afford.

Price himself reeogniz.ed that

". • • no one wL.o does not dislilre censorship should ever b8
permitted to exercise censorship."?
Price's statemen·t was not mere rhetoric, for the
Executive Order that created the Office of Censo:cship conferred on the Director of that office "absolute discretion"
.
.
.
t'1ons. 8
J.n
ceru;;or:t.ng
communlca·

The Director of the Office of

Censorship was enabled to wield semi-dict.a·i;o.r-iaJ. power,o;l he
need answer only to the President of the United States.
Such power and independence in a transistory cabinet
position was unprecedented in American history.

6'l'heodore F, Koop, Weapon of Silence (Chicago:
University of ChiC<1go Pres'8.;-T<Tii:"b),-·-pp:·1·7..::18.

7Rer.2.E..t:._2.!!-._!l}~_.9..::tfJ.c.~-- o:f__2_?E5>orshJJl., p. 1.
SI, .

.:...g.J.d,., P• 5·

9
~nst~ion

of

~~e

CensorshiP War

M~£hine

President Roosevelt directed Byron Price to oversee
the compulsory censorship of international communications.
Price was also

asl~:ed

to organize and supervise the censorship

of the domestic American press and radio on a voluntary basis.
·The government had decided that compulsory censorship of the
___ pre::>s an_d J:';;td,io _V/ou.ld not be necessary as long as patriotic
publishers and broadcasters were able to cooperate by withholding from print and the air any information that might
hamper the Allied wax· effort.
Price had to staff the central part of his censoring
organization, begin reerui ting and t:r-a:i..n:i.ng ordinar·y citizens
to work H.s censors (eventually

replt~c:ing

most- mil.i tary per ..-

smmel) , and com.·dinate alJ. of the nation's newEpaiJers and
radio stations into a self-censoring unit.

This meant eon-

tacting, organizing, an.d sv.pervising more than two thousand
daily newspapers, eleven thousand weekly or ~1em1.-weekly
papers, 925 radio stations, and thousands of scientific and
technical journals. 9

In addition there were pul)lications

from commercial, industrial, financ:.l.al, educational,
religious, fraternal., and civic organis,ations that had to be
constantly screened f'or infol'ilta'tion thB.t might be contrary to
the war effort.

Buildings had to be located to house

regional censorship operations.

Accounting and administra-

tive sections had to be set up.

1'housands of persons from

10

all walks of life had to be trained as censors. 10

The

majority of citizens employed by the Office of Censorship
teachers, housewives, bankers, writers, businessmen, and
linguists -- was put to work as postal censors in post
offices across the United States,
make good postal censors. 11

Women were believed to

According to Melvin Jacobus,

former District Postal Censor for San Francisco, there were
more women than men available as postal censors simply
because a greater number of men were serving i.n the armed
forces,

This also meant that the Office of Censorship was

able to choose from a larger group on the basis of intelligence.

Simply stated, there were more intelligent women than

men available to fill positions as postal censors because the
' 't'l·1<:; a:cme d _f orces overseaf:~-~ 12
men were :Ln
While the organization and constnJ.ction proce<:s was
still only a few weel:s old, the Office of Censorship issued,
on ,January 15, 1942, the first censorship codes for broad-casters and publishers. 1 3 These two codes were the first
10 By February of 194~3, the high point of operations,
the:c-e were 14,462 persons em~ployed. by the Office of' Censorship; cited in ,!3_?J2..'2_l't_on th_~_J?_£f:i~.~-of Cens_2EshiE, p. 8.
11 Koop, .2_P_._ cit., pp. J4·-35·. Koop says that these
women postal censors were' ". , • pa tJ.ent and would plod
steadily through letter after letter . • • ,"
12 Melvin Jacobus, interview, January 11, 1972.

1 3u. S. Office o.f Censorship, Code of Wartime
Practices for Am~:!'_).c.:<:~n,_l?!·oadc~?t~E?.• [Editfon:-'Ql'-:-Jimuar;y 12,
19~Dwashlngton, 15.C.: U. ~-;. Governm.cmt [Pnntlng Offlcej),
[19l:f2J; and .Q._?d~of_l'larti.me PracticE~.s for ilJE_flme.ric_ll.n __ EY:.~e~s_§_,
[Edltlon of January l5, 1942J \Vw.shlngton, D.C.g U.s.
Government Printing Office), 1942.

suggested guidelines for broadcasters and publishers under
the program of voluntary censorship.

Further discussion of

voluntary censorship will be taken up l.n chapter IV.
Censorship:

~:he

Silenci n~s Service

Before we begin looking at the programs of compulsory
and voluntary censorship, itis worthwhile to include a brief
-------pas-s-age -on --the- -Pl.lblic relations aspect of the Office of

Censorship,

In order for voluntary censorsh.ip to work effec-·

tively in a country that boasts of its freedom of SJ:H3ech, a
censoring agency needs, among other things, either a good
pu.blic image, or no public image.

It was impossible for the

Office o:f Censor;;hip to function ent.i.rel;y' unknown to the
public, although it tried very hard at times to stay in thro'
background out of the purJJic eye.

~'he

next best thing waH

for the Office of Censorship to have a good or acceptable
public image, and there. was a concentrated effort on the part
of the Office of Censorship and the Office o:f Wm:· Information
to build this desired image.
Byron Price was quiclc: to admit that Americans would
never like censorship: "No one need doubt where a eensor
would wind up in a popularity contest," 14' In a letter to
this writer Price stated that the Office of Censorship
• •

had no public relations staff' • , . . • 1 5 However, the

--~·---·-·-·-·

1L1.

•

Byron Prlce, quoted in Hobert E. Summers, Vlar.time
CensorEhi:e of Press and Hadio (New York: }l, W. Wilson~·-··---··"
Coffi150:i',y-,191+2) , pp; 29.:J~·-·i5Byron Price to writer, NovmnhcT 8, 19?L

12

Office of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis, was the
official public relations office for most government agencies,
as well as being the propaganda office for the United States
during the war.

Indeed, these two agencies even managed to

pool the public relations skills of its two Direc.tors in a
s.wall

booJ~:

published at the height of the war for the sole

purpose of explaining to the public the functions of the two
-------------

-

___

.

_/

offices. 10 -

-In

tl1is book Price stated that ". • , the Office-

of' Censorship does not prepare or issu.e news . .,i7

However,

one has only to read through the almost daily press releases
published by the Office of Censorship in order to take a
sk:eptica.l view of this statement.

These press releases, many

of which were textual copies of' addresses made by Price
before various c5.vic and professiona:C. groups, were clearly
designed to answer and quiet criticirsru of censorship and to
drum up continued support for and compliance with voluntary
.

.

.

censorshi.p by the press, radJ.o, and the publlc.

18

1'6

-Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and
Censorship (Washington, D .c,: American Comic~f"fon·-Publfc
Affalrs);·"T194J].
17.
. ~::..~·, p. 66.
18

Director of the Office of Censorship, PR- 35, [Press
Release No. 35] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Censorship,
October 28, 1942),·p. 1. In this, a public radio broadcast,
Price defined the related and cooperative functions of the
Office of Censorship and tl'le Office of War Information.

III

COMPULSORY CENSORSHIP:
THE

FIRS~'

LINE OF DEFENSE

The survEdllance of all communications crossing the
borders of the United States by radio, telephone, cable, or
letter )1ad begun by December 13, 191H,

This initial

censor·~

ship effort was carried out by advance units of the Army and
Nav~"

When the newl;y-created Office of Censorship took. over

these duties, it had a. functioning, though somewhat prim:i ti..vc'
organization to build upon.
Under the able leadership of Byron Price, the Office
of Censorship began con.struct:ing the compulsory censorship
codes that would regulate all radio, telephone, cable, and
mail communications,

All such communications would be read

or examined before they were allowed to leave or enter the
United States,

The objective of this and all censorship was

to insv.re that " . . • military information which might be of
aid to the enemy be scrupulously wi"thhe.ld at the source." 1
1

Franklin D. Roosevelt, statement quoted in H.h;torical Reports on War Administration, A Report on the Office of
f~2..;.;:..c:rsl1:iJ?, (Washington, D.c.: u. s .-Gov'8~rr1ment Yrrr~rrng··-·--
Offlce, l';!q·)), p, 5; hereafter referred to as Heport on the
.QJ fi.£5:...2E.c?_lJg.~~.§ 11 i.l2 •
·-- ·-----~·--·

13

14
'rhe first compulsory censorship codes to be issued
were those for operating companies, cable and radio, and
radiotelephone communications. 2

These three types of c·ommu-

nications were those that were most often utilizedfor the
rapid transmission of international messages.

It was neces-

sar:y to maintain stringent surveillance of these communications to insure that no information of value be
·to--the··-enemy~-

--eithe-r --inten-tio:nally or

tr~wsmi tted

inadvertently~

Those

companies providing radiotelephone or cablegram services to
businesses or individuals were required to submit all proposed messages to a censor for clearance before the message
was transmitted.

Field censors were stationed in the oper"'

ating rooms of' tl:wse companies.

In most cases these local

censors conld eva'.uate most messages in a very shol"t period
of time.

If neccE:sary, they could delay a proposed message

until they sought advice from the Office of Ce.nsorsh:i.p in
Washington.

These cens'C>rs would, upon reviewing a proposed

international message, ta!m one of eight typros of actions
(1)

PASS

( 2)

DELAY

2

Rules f~()J.:: __Oper:_a.:ti.ne;
1
19Tt2 (Wash:tngton 1 D.C.x
U. So Government Printing Office), 1942; hereaftE'r referred
to as ~-ules for__9J2C0J.tj.:..I?.('.;__ gg_0Jl_~n;~!'~ ( 2-19··1>2) 1 U. S, Office
of. C~nsorship I u •,_,0_:_ c~.:l2,Le_ .8.-!Jd l\ad~£...!:~_J].S0!:_l?_hiJ)_JZeKulation.~2·
Ed:t t.1on of :February 19, 19£1·2 \ Waslnngton, D, C , : U, S. Government Printing Office) , 1942; hereafter referred to as Cable
and Radio Regulations ( 2-19--Li-2); and u, s. Office of ce!)s-ci'r-0
s h 1 p , u ::-.§~~=J[i~~u:-§~~I~P()2 Ol}_:!~.Q~.~ s () r:~ h i:eJ3~ll~1§,t ~£!:.:~. • Edition
of February 1.9, 19<+2 WarJhlngton, D.C.: U, s. Government
Printing Office), 1942; hereafter referred to as RadiotelepholJ.0.. Regt.t.!£1:.:0-on~ ( 2-19-42),
----0

u, S: ?ffice of Censorship

Co~l!E§.~:.C_s, Edlt:ton of February 19

1

1.5
(3)

PARAPHRASE

(4)

DELETE

(.5)

SUPPRESS

( 6)

CANCEL

( 7)

RETURN

( 8)

I\EFER

a part

FOR CORRECnON
to Chief Cable Censor for his action or

advice.3
-- --A---la:cge --number of American businessGs utilized

radiotelephone and cable messages in conducting their normal
business affairs.

Few people, if any, felt these businesses

would intentionally aid the enemy, but many did not realize
how seemingly innocent messages could be of great value to
the forces of Germany and Japan.

Gel"man Uooboat commanders

could, by intercepting these messages, study the names of
ships and cargo J.ists to determine which ones would be
carrying the more strategically important goods, and then lie
in wait for these ships·.

For this reason operating companies

were prohibited from transmitting unauthorized coded call
letters or special business signals that could possibly be
utilized as a code.

Even "fixed" or "canned" holiday

greetings that could possibly be utilized as codes were

. 1 pernusrnon.
. .
4
pro h,J.''b't
'1 e d wJ't•,tou·c' spec:La.
'l'hose persons or companies using cablegrams or

tele~

granw between the United States and any foreign cov,ntry had

3Ru1"'.ii_.fO,£__Q_p:_;_Eati_!}Z_Qomp,.;~)''lie~ ( 2-19-42), pp. 4-5.
4 Ibid. , p, 11.
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to adhere to specific regulations.

All telegrams (or cable-

grams, radiograms, etc.) had to contain the full name and
address of both the sender and the addressee .5

This regu-

lation, while serving an important purpose, produced so:mc
rather amusing incidents.

One cable censor was mor8 than a

bit surprised when he insisted that a cablegram from London
fully identify the sender, who had merely signed his message
In -cornp-J.iance with the censor' z

------;;George-;-~~-

following reply was promptly sent:
PULL NA!'IIE IS GEORGE REX1
ADDRESS, BUCKINGHAM PALACE. 6
Cablegram regulations applied to everyone -- including the
King of Englctnd,
Anything umtained in a cable message that could
_possibly serve as a code was prohibited.
the U,

s.

On August 31, 19LfJ,

Office of Censorship announced an Agreement between

it and British Censorship to prohibl t cablegrams and radio."
grams containing orders for flowers between the United Stgterc:
and Europe,

It was feared that anJrone, including enemy

agents, might use a type of flower, the number of flowers, or
their color to transmit coded messages,

To protect against

this poEJsi bili ty Bri tisli and American Censorship officials
prohibited eab1egram and radiogram orders for flowers between
their two countries in order to "

• , prevent the use of

5cl3:J:le__ _J!;)].!LB..adio Regulatior.ts. ( 2-19-42), p, 2.
6
'I'heodore F'. Koop, Wea£011 of Silence (Chicago 1
University of Chicago Press, --l9Tf'6), p..;-..l)_s;-
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flowers as a medium of' private codes."?

Cable users were

also prohibited from making any reference to", •• location,
identity, description, movement, or prospective movement of
any merchant vessel, aircraft, naval or military vessel or
naval or military force, including the collective or
individual personnel thereof, operated by the United States
or other nations opposing the Axis powers," 8
Teiephone or ra-diotelephone corrnections crossing the

borders of the United States were monitored by censors.

The

first radiotelephone code limited the languages of these
calls to English, French, Spanish, and Portugul'>se, and lan··
guages other than English were allowed only when translators
were a.vailable a·f; the censoring

. '.. 9
po~n·,

Persons using

inter~

national telephone service were prohibited from rncmtioni.ng
merchant

OJ~

mi.li tary shipping infonns.ti.on, from using any

numbers or words that could be interpreted a.s codes, from
criticizing the armed forces of the United States, or from
say:i.:og anything that the censor, in his judgment, believed
would", , , bring aid or comfort to the enemy

,.10

A telGphone censor could immediately :interrupt or completely
cutoff any telephone conversation he felt violated c.ensorsh:i.p

--------·

?Director of the Of:fice of Censor·ship, PR·~h9, [Press
Release No, 1+9] (Washington, D.C,: U, s. Off'ice·-ar·censorship), August Jl, 19lfJ; these press releases hereafter
referred to as Cens.:?.E.ship pr:.,e_£:2.....!3::J.c;.§._~::.,..E,2,.:_ ___ , (date),

c~·:1?1c~_ll:.!l~..BadlQ_R<l,gu1a'j;io!l_::: (2-·19-Lt2), P• 5.
9
Ra..s:Ll.<::~.:::l~:..ED..9J:<e R~2iclati.onE;_ ( 2~ 1.9·-1+2) , p, l.
8

10 Ib'd

.,:.._~~..:._ "

f

:p 2
e

'

18

regulations.

Cable and telephone censors were established

throughout the United States and in other parts of the world.
'£here were censorship stations in Honolulu, Brownsville, New
York, Nogales, Seattle, Chicago, Tucson, Akron, Balboa, New
Orleans, !Viiami, San Antonio, Los Angeles, San Juan, El Paso,
Iceland, and various border points between the United States
and Mexico • 11

'rhe U, S, Office of Censorship also cooperated

----------with -All-ie-d- c-e-nso-rship i-n- parts of

information and personnel.
The most important function of cable censorship may
have been the protection of merchant ships,

CenBors pro-"

hi bi ted .all reference to ship movements in international communications,

'l.'his effort, according to official sources, was

", •• wholly successful.

No instance o:f lOf''"'

OJ:'

damage to s.

merch;,.nt verosel through int<-Jrception. of communications was
reported throughout the entire war." 12
Business firms, however, had to be able to carry on
their OI)erations.

These firms had to be able to notify their

trading associates that shipments of goods would depart and
arrive at certain ports at certain times.

In order· to carry·

on. these functions, business firms using cable or radio-

11Kccl<;lp ,
12

't , p • 2D
.7 •

E.Jl.....!o".~,

Rep_or~t~_s>!.!_ th...;,_Q£f..:iJ:s:.. ..2L~J1?..'?!.''?_12lE, pp. 28-29.
The statement 1.s cautJ.ous.l;y made; J.f would have been undesirable to attribute such losses to inadequate cE1.ble censorship. Winston Churchill. in The Second World War, Vol. V,
qosj_~-th_::_ _I5-ii!§ ( Boeton1 Houghtori.ll:i:f:Eim;-r9siT:·-pp. J-16,
provJ.des data on Allied and U. s. merchant fleet losses, but
he does not a ttr.i bute any J.osse s to faulty eensorship,
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telephone communications were authorized to use any one of
nine commercial codes in their messages,

Each coded message

ha.d to include a prearranged coded abbreviation or indicating
symbol at tho beginning of each message to indicate to
censors the authenticity of the message and the code being
:i

used,

The nine commercial codes and indicating symbols

"

i

r
""
I

I,
':

i

-~

I

authorized by the Office of Censorship were:
-

:1?

] n di c ~ t ~£1JL__S J':ffi_9_'2.!. ~ .J

Commercial Code

---·---·~o---

ABC Sixth Edition Code
ACME Commodity and Phrase
Code and Supplement
Bentley's Complete Phrase Code
Bentley's Second Phrase Code
Lombard General Code
I.ombard Shipping Code and Appendix
New Standard Halt Word Code
New Standard 'l.'h:cG<c Letter Code
Peterson's Third Edition

ABC
AC]I[!E
BENCOM
BEN SEC
LOMGEN
I,OJVlSHIP
STANHAF'
STANTER
PET

In addition certain banks and other businesses were allowed
to use "test words" in interna.ti.onal communications.
test words usually

appe~red

These

as the first or last wonl in the

text of a message and were used by these firms to insure the
authenticity of their messages, 14
Commercial codes and test words were necessary
exceptions to censorship regulations prohibiting the use of
private codes.

The main'tenan0e of businGss aetivity was

essential to the war effort and to the .American economy,

l35L~P.:;.££~')2±1?..J:res~d~~.le9-..§.:01L12!..~.2• Js.nuary 20, 191+2;
see also Davld Kahn, 1'he Codebreakers: l'he Storv of Secret
Yf!j~ t~r:z. (New York: l'he.1iiac1i1i1lar1-c-om:Pany-;191i'lJ':-p;--5H>-:--·
14

p. 12'

_9el'}.~?rr-Jlip

Pr-es,s

.E_~~~

No.!. 39e, January 30, 19i+J,
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Cable and radiotelephone censorship. lasted for the
duration of the war.

Ori January JO, 19i.fJ, censorship regu ..

lations covering cable, radio, and radiotelephone communications were combined in a single code. 1 5 The nature of comcensorship is best described by quoting a sentence

pulsor~'

from this revised code: "All communications shall be sent,
filed or transmitted at the sender's rlslc and may be con----

demned, suppressed, delayed, or otherwise dealt with at the .
i"
o.f th e censor w1'tl1011t no t'1ce," 16
d 1scre;1on
Compulsory censorship of internationalcommunications

by cable, radio, or radiotelephone was rigidly fixed and
enforced.

'l'he majority of the users of these types o:E inter-

ml"tional eommun).e:.a:tion dE,vices were bona fide ·businesses tho.t
normally conducted their activitieB on an international scale.
These busirHHJses, for the most part, read:lJ.y complied with
censorship regulations and there islitt.le available evidence
to support the existence of significant non-compliance or
pro·test of the cable and radiotelephone n>gulations by these
business firms.
Some individuals did try to evade cable censorship
without actus.lly trying to aid the enemy,

One man in Pearl

Harbor wanted to advise his friends in the United States that

5u. s, Office of Censorship, U~<-- S:_,S:_~~r;<l:£.~l?.. .ltt?.€':ulatlons, Edition of' January JO, l9h·J \VIa:;hJ.ngton, D.C.: u. s.
Gov.ernment Printing Office) , 1. 91-1-3; here<:dte:r. referred to as
Cc~nsorsh~...E~!:.t.la i:_:!:,~~ ( 1- 30-·I;+J) • This r<:JvisNl and combined
code 1nclud.cd posta.i censorshlp regulations; post8J. censorship is discussed in the next section of this chapter.
.

1

16.[ .. d

:~.'?.:!:_•'

p.

2
,,
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he was leaving Hawaii on a specific date and that he would
arrive in the United States on another date,

Cable censors

would not allow use of these dates because they obviously
revealed the departure and arrival times of the ship on which
the man would saiL

This man then attempted to disguise the

dates in his cablegram.

He was caught and fined two hundred
dollars for attempting to evade censorship. 17

compliance as did cable censorship.

Postal censorBhip was

compulsory, it also touched upon the life of the ordinary
citizen more than any other for·m of compulsory censorship.
Protests of postal censorship were frequent.

There were

nu.merous incidents of non .. complianco, and attempts to evade
postal censorship often resulted in severe penalties.

The

story of postal censorship is the subject of the next section
of this chapter on compulsory censorship.

The censoring of all mail entering or leaving the
United States began within hours of the attack on I)earl
Harbor.

Army and Navy officers, previously trained as postal

censors, handled this oper.·ation until the Of':fice of Censorship wa:o equiJlped to asBwne direction of poHtal censorship.
Compulsory censorship of comnnmi.cations crossing the
border·s of the United States comprised ninety--nine percent of

---·-----
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the work of the Office of Censorship. 18

Of this total,

postal censorship required the greatest effort.

More than

one million letters per day passed through postal censorship
stations and required, at the peak of operations, more than
ten thousand employees. 19

Obviously, postal censors did not

read every letter that entered or left the country.

Mail

from servicemen overseas was checl>:ed by mill tary censors.
Office of Censorship was, and still is, a secret. 20

EvEfn

before envelopes were opened their destination and retux."11
addresBes were checked against a "watch list."

When one of

these addresses was found on an envelope the letter was
FoB tal censors were

examined.

~Llso

trained to spot hand-

wri·ting pecu1:tar:l.ties because enmny agents \Wing thEl mails
could obviously change their addre:;;sos. 21
The first postal censorship code was issued by the
Office of Censorship in April of 19LJ-2. 22

Postal censorship

regulations applied to all mail crossing the
United States.

bordeJ~s

of the

These regulations covered matter prohibited

in international mail, mail to enemy :na:tionals in any country,

--------~

18

'9
.1.

Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.

£1eport on the Of[is-~~-.2fS2.J1SO:S'?.fliJ2., p. 19,

20

21
·

~bid.' p.

21.

Ibid.

~ 2 u.

S. ?f!:ice of Ce~sorship, :0, S, P?fli;:_~J:..._Q.gns_9..!:~i:E
Edltl.OJ? _o~·. Aprll 13, 1942 ( i'/ashJ.ngton, D.c .:
• ~3. Gove:nnnent P:nntJ.ng Office), 1942.

~egu:l:atl.Ol2;,?_,
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mail to prisoners of war, and the mailing of exposed and
unexposed film. 2 3 Information prohi.blted from international
mail was basically the same as that prohibited in cable,
radio, and telephone communications that crossed the borders
of the United States.
The Office of Censorship hirGd thousands of ordtnary
citizens who wen• trained as postal censors,
-li.~sted h~ax>cl.ly

to

WOJ..'t
1

.

Their tx·ain.ing

·nw:t-e than a week befox·e these peop1e \VGrG put• •

.

.,

open1ng, exam:uu.ng, and censor:;_ng rnal.L,

2Lf

Included

in this wide range of personnel were postal censon; who could
2 ,.
act as translators in mox·e thm1. a hund1·c;d l.8nguagec . . :;

were translators Vlho could rE:ad shorthG.nd in such
HinduE:tt~.ni

'.rhere

c~sotcr·ic

(in :Braille! ) ,

Portuguese H.oman:i.:zed Japanese (Japanese language rtomani.H,d by
Portuguese Catholic priestt>; also usecJ. by Japanesro who J.i ved
in Brazil) , and PaiJiamento (a languz.ge comprising Du'tc)\,
Spanish, Portuguese and: English) . 26
In ,January of 1943 postal censorship regulations were

included cable, :radio, a.nd. telc--·

24
phone regulations.

This edition was then used intact for the

duration of the war.

One important section of these new

postal censorship regulations prohibited the use of secret
inlcs in international mail. 28 The inclusion of this prohi.bition resulted, in part, from the activities of a German
agent, Ernest Lehmitz, who operated out of Staten Island.

A

summary of the Lehmi.tz. story follows below.
Thf!._l•_el:lr!_!.L\:.~-§:~Or'~Y.:·

In February of 1942, a letter

mailed from New York to a suspicious address in Bilbao, Spain
was intercepted and found to be carrying a secret message
written with invisible i.nlc,

For the next two months the

Office of C:ensor:c<'lip c:are:fully v.ratched all mail from this
person in Nrn¥ York.

Tbe l0tter writor used two aliases in

hi8 return acldl'ec'8es, "Fred I,ewis" aEd "Fred Sloane."

His

letters during this period were intercepted and all were
found to be earr:y-ing t>ecret--ink messages,
nLewis" sent; his last

mess~-}_ges,

which stated, in inv:i.si ble

in!\:, that he was suspending his operations,

closed with "Heil Hitler."
among others,

~~n

On April 11, 1942,

'I'he letters were

"J"ewis" had been writing to,

address in Portugal,

1'he Federal Bureau of

Invec;tigation began a handwriting analysis of baggage deelarations of passengers from Portugal and a match was discovered between "Fred I.ewis" and EnH3EJt Frederick Lehmitz of
TompkinsviJ.lc, New York.

Lehmi tz. was kept under sutveillance

for more tlvm a year and in June, 1943 he was arrested.

He
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had operated a boarding house on Staten Island, specializing
in rooms for sailors from whom he hoped to gather valuable
shipping information.

In September Lehmitz was sentenced to
thirty years in prison for his activities. 29 Lehmitz's
sentence, though severe, was not as harsh as that meted out
to a German agent in Havana.

This man, apprehended through

the effqrts of American and British Censorship, was g1ven a
highly scc:r.•et; · seveh hour miJ.i tary trial and then summarily
shot by a firing squad of the Cuban army, 30
Keeping a close watch for secret inks ws.B the job of
the Technical Operations Division of the Office of Censorship,,
This highly specialized and secret division enlic;ted the aid
of chemistE, phygJ.cists, and ink and

PHlJCJ:'

:,:pecialists,

Invisible inks Wfolre of two general types,
included the use of milk,· vinegar, fruit ,juiceb, and urinrl ae.
invisible ink, and all were used during the war,

1'hese

elements could be applied to paper and would remain invisible
until the paper had been heated, which would then eause the
written message to appear,
used what are known as

:I' he second type of invisible inks

symyJa'th<~tic

chemicals,

This involved

using one ehemical to wri to an :i.nvicdble message and later
applying a second chemical to the same paper to rencle:e the
writing visible.

2

?For thcl J,ehmitz story see

~~I~~-.£n.._the

_Qff:i.ce

_9f

Qer!fl.~£'.f1_hl.,J2, pp. ~·6 ... Lf7; see also Koop, .t?.P..1...£~~. , pp. ""8).:'8'?.

3°sec ~rt on the Office
also Koop, E.E.· ci'F:IJJ5-;-·)::-rs,

of_f!"22§.£I.Sh)J·~, pp, IJ-5-1<;6;
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The most popular methods for writing in
were of the organic type,

invisible~

inlc

Enemy agents had to utilize the

simplest methods and materials because they could not carry a
large collection of supplies and chemicals with them at all
times.

Also, sophisticated chemicals could not always be

obtained by an agent without arousing suspicion.

For these

reasons fruit juices -- and human urine -- were used quite
--- - -f-req-uen·Gl-y-,--

With these simple methods and supplies enemy agents
had to write -·- or print

clearly, and their messages had

to be simple and succinct.

Often these messages appeared as

though they had been written by a youngster, and this posed a
special problem .·''or the Office of Censorship,

Many ten-year-·

old boys in the United States during the war were as fam:U.Ja.r
with invisible ink manufactured from fruit juices or
as were enemy agents using the r.:mne methods,

vim~g&.r

Many

.American youngsters use.d these. homemade secret inks to send.
"club" messages to one another through the U, S. MaiL
Postal censors could not distinguish between the innocent
secret ink message .of a ten-year-old club member and the con'"
cealed message:3 of dangerous enemy agents,

~:here fore

evex·y

ins·tance of secret ink usage had to be investigated, and
l''.B,I. agents, acting on Censorship information, often found
themselves explaining to parents tlle reasons their young sons
should not be allowed to continue usir,.g invisible inks,

The

young boys were clearly .. ". albeit innocently -- in violation
of wartime censorship regulations and such violations could

27
bring a $10,000 fine and ten years in

pri~on.

Usually a

visit to the parents of an unknowing young violator sufficed,
but each investigation of invisible ink usage cost the uffice
of Censorship much time and money during the war.3 1
In addition to secret inks, postal censors had to be
on the watch for "open codes,"

This was the prearranged use

of apparently harmless numbers, letters, or· words that could
-----------convey-- hi-dden messages.

Such things as inter-na tione. l che-ss

games, the mailing of student's grades, letters with knitting
instructions, or even the childish scrawl of an infant could
in rea.lity be prearranged codes.
prohibited in international. mail.

These things were all
One case of an open code

using prearranged words brought a stJff pri.son sentence for
Velvalee Dicldnscn, a dealer in dolls.

A description of the

Dickinson case is the next topic under postal censorship.

________ __

...
'£he Dickinson ,story,
~

Velvalee Dickinson was born in

Sacramento, California in 1893.

As an adult she worked in

San Francisco and was popular in J·apanese-American social
life.

In 1937 she moved to New York and opened an exchu;:iVcl

doll shop.

B~· 1942 she had a world-wide clientele, )Z

In ,January of

19~-2

a Seattle woman contacted the

Federal Bureau of Investigation and gave them a letter that

31Jiluch of this information on secret or invisible
inks derived from interview with Norman Carlson, January 11,
1972; see also Kahn, 2J2..:__£_~t., PP• 522-521+.
,
3:-For the Dickinson story see R~J~~! on_.:~h!:- Offl:_~-~'2!.
Cel!§.?_rshlp, pp. 48-49, and Koop, _2;e_._c:J. t., pp, 92-91).
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had been "returned" to her from Buenos Aires.

The letter had

originally been mailed from the United States to Buenos Aires,
but because the letter was incorrectly addressed the
Argentine post office returned it to the return address given
on the envelope.

The return address on the envelope was that

of the Seattle woman, but she stated that she !mew no one in
Buenos Aires and had not mailed the letter.
--------taine-d r!efere-nce --to a- bro-ken doll

skirt."

~~dressed

The letter conin a Hula Grass

An added message said, " • . . I expect all damages

to be repaired by the first week in February ... 33
Shortly afterward an Ohio woman received a similar
letter marked "Return To Sender," also from Buenos Aires.
This letter bore her Ohio return address but had not been
mailed by the Ohio woman.

This letter said, "• •• Mr. Shaw
will be back to work soon ... J 4 On the chance :the letters
might be coded messages the Office of Censorship checked all

mail going to the address in Buenos Aires.

Other letters

were then intercepted containing odd messages that told of
"dolls" being "repaired."

Checking with the persons whose

addresses were given as the return addresses on thesG letters
to Buenos Aires, the J?,B.I. discovered that these women all
knew VelvaJ.Ge Dickinson, an exclusive doll dealer in New York,

In January of 1944 F.B.I. agents arrGsted Mrs, Die kin·~
son and searchGd her apartment, finding", , • Japanese

3JKoop, 2l2..:_s:_it., p. 92.

3 \J;bid. ' p. 9 3.
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clothing, records of Japanese music, • • •." and an address
book containing the names of J'apanese friends )5

The letters

Mrs. Dickinson mailed to Buenos Aires (she admitted mailing
tl1em) were incorrectly addressed and therefore returned by
the Argentine post office to the return address indicated on
the envelopes,

Many of the names and places Mrs. Dickinson

used in these letters wer·e the same as the names of some
'

---------united s-tates -warships being

repair~d

cities;

Apparently, "dolls" being repaired in San Francisco could
mean "ships" being repaired in San Francisco,

Some of the

names used in Mrs. Dickinson's letters, such as "Mr. Shaw,"
matched those o:f well-knovvn warships, such as the "U, S. S,
Shaw."

'l'he autho::·ities believed that Mrs. Dickinson

attempted to convey information on the condition and locatic>n
.
.
of Amer:tcan
and .AJ.l:Led
war vessels. 36 Mrs. Dickj_nson was
charged with censorship evasion.

A more serious charge would

have been more difficult to prove, for there was apparently
no proof that she had contacted an enemy of the United States.
Velvalee Dickinson was found guilty of the lesser charge and
. a $10,000
'
' . ,·37
sentenced to ten years in prison and
f1ne
Other postal censorship regulations required that
stamp dealers and bon.a fide stamp colleetors acquire special

35Ibid, , p, 97, · Incrc"dibly, Koop im})lies that aapa···
nese clothllig and ,Ta.panese phonograph n~cords found in !'irs,
Dickinson's apartment constituted incriminating evidence!

JO
permits from the Office of Censorship before they could mail
stamps out of the country.J 8 American postage stamps were
nearly as good as American greenbacks and the government did
not want these stamps to get into the hands of the Axis
powers.

One Presidential Cabinet member mailed a remittance

of two d.ollars for a Nazi publieation in l\'iexico.

When this

remittance was returned to him by censors he protested and
his mail was oxenl})t from censorship

because of his official position.

Byron Price replied to the

irate Cabinet member that his office was ", • , charged with
censoring all communications, not all except his."J9
Postal censors discovered, through an intercepted
•

•

letter, a shipment of d:Lamonds concealed :Ln chocolates.

14-()

CensorcJ aJ.so dj.r;oovered a German cipher whereby an enti.re
page, typewr·i ttm··, in code, was rEJd.uced to the siz.G of a
period, which could then be hidden in an otherwicl<.l innocent
letter. 41

Publishers o;f scientific or technical joiiX'rw.ls

could apJJly· fo:c a. speoi.al license to mail their public<:.tioxw
abroad only after signing affidavits stat1ng that employee's
preparing articles for mailing wcH'e ", • • trustworthy and
•

e

~ not connt~cted with subversive activitieB ~ ~~ 1+ 2
3~censorship Press Release No, 3"3, n.d. [september,

( ?) _r:--·--~--··-~-----·-----~----- . ··------·~-·

39Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. ·

!Viarch J.S, 1942.
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Many persons tried to evade postal censors even
though they were not attempting to aid the enemy.

One man in

New Zealand was fined for concealing a letter between the
pages of a magazine he mailed to Utah.

A woman tried to hide

a letter in a basket of flowers as she entered the United
~

II

States.

She was caught and fined forty dollars for censor-

ship eva,slon.

Shoes were a :f'avori te place o:f' coneealmcnt,

~---

for attempting to evade censorship in that manner.
Postals censors also protected American investments
and contracts by carefully examining .important business mail.
In one case the United States had contracted for the entire
output of Ecuadorian quinlne, whicll was used to combat
malaria.

An inter'cepted letter from a firm in Ecuadol:' told

of a large transfer of quinine to a European port.

1'l:te ship-

ment, which the United States Government considered to be in
violation. of its contract with

way to Europe by· sea.

Ecuador~-

was already on its

A United States destroyer was dis--

patch.ed and the quinine cargo was promptly seized on the high
seas.

In time of war anything is fair, even if it bordln·s

on piracy!
cea.

This was not the only case of seizure of cargo at

Censorship intercepts led. to the knowledge of' a vitally-

needed C<U'go of zinc.

This ship was forceably turned. back to

an American port and· the cargo commandeered.
A Belgium firm operating out of the United States and
specializing in the production of industrial. diamonds was
found to be smuggling these diamonds into Europe.

A letter

J2
from this firm to another in Sweden advised the Swedish firm
that a shipment of steel twist drills would soon leave the
United States.

The letter instructed the Swedish firm to dip

the drills in an acid bath.

A postal censor thought this was

rather severe treatment for steel drills and recommended an
investigation.

The drills were found to be hollow, filled

with dtamonds, and capped with a bronz," plug.
woul-a-- me-lt --the-

brony~-e

:rho acid bath

plugs and expose the diarnond::; ~

The

head of the firm in the United States was convicted of
.evasJ.on
.
. Ja1.
''li+J
censors 1up
ana.' sen t·ence d....,o one year 1.11
,

The foregoin,r>; represent only a very small percentage
of the exciting and successful activities of postal censors.
Not all decisions by posta.l censors v,,exe quire so exciting,
nor as easily un6.erstood,

One magaz5.ne called the decision

of' a postal censor "individual idiocy" when he censored. an
American citizen's letter to a friend. in South America in
which the American said. the United Sta·tes was in for a long,
hard

'l'hree weeks after Pearl Harbor the Hawaiian vol-

cano 1\!auna Loa erupted, belching smoke and fire.

Local cen-·

sors carefully deleted all reference to the eruption in mall
leaving Hawaii on the grounds that, because the flames from
the eruption were visible at night, the J'apanese might use
1\!auna Loa as a beacon for another assault on Hawali. 4 5 1\!aybe

_____ ___
......,..

4·3

~-ort

1+1+

on

t~~

Office of

Cen~_9£Sh~J2•

"Nonsense by the Censor," .J:lew Re;eulH-ic, July 13,

1942, p. 36.
4

pp. 1+5-53·

5Koop, £:Q_:__S.~.!,, pp" 66-67 ·

JJ
the censors felt the Japanese navy had forgotten how to get
to Hawaii after three long weeks!
An~ele_§__':£im!"s

In February of 194·2 Los

issues being sent to Mexico (and other

countries) by U. S. Mail were, without the publisher's
knowledge, subjected to "raz.or blade" C(msoring by postal
censor's before being sent on to the subscribers.

At the same

time newspapers originating in Texas and presumably carr;ring
------------------t-he- same s-y-ndicated articles arrived in Mexico untouched by

the censor's razor blade.

One item deleted from the Los

An~Seles

Times by postal censors concerned the funeral of
l.j.6
Carole Lombard.
There is some evidence that postal censorship wa.s
used in attempts to muzzle critics of the Roosevelt admin:i.stration.

Wendell Willkie engaged in what J'ames MacG1·egor

BurnB calls "constructive criticism" of the Roosevelt adJ:ninistration. 47

Willkie, a supporter of individual rights aiid an

ardent internationalist., criticized the government for its
slowness in civil rights, and urged Roosevelt to establish a
"second front" to help Russia.

Willkie, "goading the

President," according to some persons, 48 criticized the
"racists and reactionaries" of the Democratic pa:cty,

He also

6
h News story from. "Editor and Publisher," February 21,
191-1-2, p. 6, reprinted in Robert E. Summers ( comp.) , Wartime
.9..~~-§.(Jrfl.bl}l__()_f.,., Pre 3.2~?-E~c:lc.. Radio (New York: H. w. Wilsoii-(S'cimpany,
19'-'·2), pp. 18 1+-1 5·

8

I+?,Tames MacGregor Burns, Hoosevelt: The Soldier of
F'reedom (New York: Harcourt. Brace-Jovanov-ich ,--rnc-::1,-9-'?''()T,

:r:-T74-:

VJ

~-sit?.!.~, •

P. 4J7.

charged Roosevelt with "• , • one-man rule, confused adminis.. 49
tratlon, [and] self-perpetuation in power ,
• •
Willkie chided Roosevelt for not using the
aggresFJively following Pearl Harbor. 50

u. s.

Navy more

HiB continuous

attacks on the RooFJevelt adrniniBtration ", •• covered
generally the wide range habitual to the leader of the

.. 51

opposition
party
•
'
.

was preparing to V·lri tE~ articles

for the London Evenin(f Standard.

Roosevelt was "scared" that

Willlcie 's discourse on foreign affairs, "which he does not
c2

understand," would damage international relations.::>

The

President instructed Price to visit Willkie and explain that
f).

~

"

he mu.st svbm.i t to censorship at the border like

one else," 53

ever~r . .,

'rhis was done a.nd Willkie dJ.d not like it.

He

continued to cri i.j.cize the administratlon and the Office: cf'

Censorship for their policies.

He rebuked Price for allowing

a speech by Vice-President Henry Wallace to leave the United
States undelayed to be reprinted in England.

Willkie's

articles, however, were delayed by censors before they were
allowed to leave the country. 5lJ·

IJ-9 ..
]. bHJ,, , p • LJ99 •
50J.b" '

.-:...2:S!-

11

:

p. 222 •

"1
)·Byron
Price to writer, December 20, 1971.
''2

)""]"b"d
. l -~

Pr~ce

quotes Roosevelt.

''3Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.

..l

51'

· ""Koop,

.?]l_:. ci·~.,

pp. 252-251+,
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This was not the only time censorship would be used
in an attempt to muzzle a critic of the administration.

In

early 19Lf4· the private correspondence of Vivien Kellems, an
Alnerican citizen .and frequent administration critic, was
made public on the floor of Congress.

A furor arose that

involved President Roosevelt, Congress, and the Office of
Censorsl~ip,

r

p-ostal

That affair is the next, and last, story under

ce:nSoi'sh-ip--~---

The Kellems stor;y.

To begin thG Kellems story it is

necessary to describe a basic postal censorship procedure,
The United States and British Censorship offices utilized a

I

"watc;h list" of German nationals living in various parts of
th~c"l

world,

Using this Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked

Nationals.55 eenso:cs could watch for mail to certain individuals in certain cities.

Many cities of South America and

Europe were believed to be centers of Axis activlty.

Buenos

Aires was one, and "• • , anything to or from Lisbon was sure
to be opened ... .5 6 Important passages taken from mctil to and
from these German nationals were labeled "Intercept" and
relayed to appropriate agencies having an intet"est in their
contents.

Thus censored portions of ci ti7.ens

distributed into many hands.

letteJ~s

were

These "intercepts" were, of

course, treated as secrets.· But when a secret is shar·0cl by

""
.>;;Report
on the Office of Censorshjp, p, 11. 'rhe
number of-nam"es on t!iTs~';wa'EcJi TTs0 t;•--r·Tucli:!ated betwe~>n
7.5,000 to 100,000 persons; see Knight, .2.l2.:_~cit,, p. 80,
6
.5 .. Intereepts," N~w Y_?rk~, May 11, 19'~·6, p. 22,

too many people, it soon loses its element of secrecy.
Vivien Kellems was an American industrialist.

She

headed a successful manufacturing firm in Connecticut.

She

had long been a vocal critic of the operations of the
Roosevelt administrations, especially of the various income

~
H

tax laws.

defeate~

In 19L1-2 Miss Kellems ran for Congress but was
In J~anuary

by Clare Boothe Luce in the IJ:Cimaries, 57

L __~ ·- of-194·~ -vivien

Kellems voiced her intention to

rc~fuse

to pay

a portion of her 191J-3 income tax.

In adcU·Uon Bhe urged
other industrialists to do the same.5 8 Miss Kellems, who

traced her heritage to 1636 in Virgini.a,59 declared the
employee withholding tax laws to be ", ,

] . ,.· 60
an d. uncons·t l. t _,)). t.J..ona"'
quote

scripture~

illegal, immoral,

To support her statement she woulcl.

from the Bible:

And it came to pasrJ in those days
that there went out a decree from
Caesar Augustus, that all the world
should be taxed. And all went to be
taxed, everyone into his own oi.ty.61
Secn;tary of the
Kellems's

~.'reasury

~J"i:;atementG

Henry Morgenthau cri ti.cized Miss

as "smacking of dislo;y-alty. "

62

On the

5?Anna Rothe (ed.), Current Biographv (New York:
H. W. Wilson Company, 1948) ·;···i)P. y,co.~ J!Tz ;~

5 8,:_~.2,9.
l~'b .., • ~ P e Ji')1· 1
. e
l'O

.;/Vivien Kellems, ToLL, ~'axes and Troub10 (New York:
E , P , Dutton , 1 9 52 ) , p • ro.--·-···-·~··---~-------··-----

60J:_bi~.
61

6'>

• p. 8.

Quoted in .ibi£., p. 18; the passage is J.,uke

"'Hothe, 2J?.:... S':~J:, , p, JLH,

2:1~·3·
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floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman John
Coffee of Washington said lVJiss Kellems' remarks on the withholding of payment of her taxes were "highly dangerous."

He

accused Miss Kellems of "downright subversive conduct"
because she called on other employers to follow her example
of noncompliance with the tax laws,

The Congre llSman hardly

meant to_ praise the lady when he implied that the profits
----franc n.e-r --c-ompany- (-which had defense contracts)-

"a

~

•

were

earned through the blood , . ," of her countrymen fighting i.n
the front lines.

Coffee further characterized Miss Kellems

as a "P-A-Y-triot," rather than a patriot, and said that by
her statements ". . , she is, in
abov.t the

<~sta,bl:t;,hment

worldng to bring
63
~ n in America~

effcc~t,

of fascism •

,

Shortly a:fter Coffee made his remarks on the floor of
the Hour3e, 64 coh'nmJ.st Drew Pearson, in a radio commentary,
<

reported that Vivien Kellems had been correspomUng privately
with a "blocked" German. national living in Argentina.

Pear··

son even quoted directly f'rom one of lVJi.ss Kellems' private
.
6S· A furor aro[;e over
letters to this German na t1onal,
Pearson's quoto.tions from one of Miss K.ellews' IH"ivate
letters.

Where had he gotten the private correspondence of

an American citiz.en'?

Was not the privacy of the United

States lViail inviolate?

Pt.

78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944),

J8
On March Jl, 1941+, Congressman Coffee again mounted
his pulpit to inveigh against Vivien Kellems.

Further clas->

sifying her remarks on taxation as "sabotage," he said Vivi0:n
Kellems' public statements were motivated by", , • seditious
enemy influences •• , ," 66 Casting doubt and suspicion on
Miss Kellems's loyalty, Coffee echoed Drew Pearson's charges
that she ", , , has for some 2 [sic] years been carrying on
----------with --a --wcll.:..known Na:z,i age:nt named Cou.nt F::r·ede::cick Kar-1 von

Zedlitz in Buenos Aires, Argentina." 67

But what came next

from Congressman Coffee was even more surpx-·ising, for he
began to quote verbatim from Miss Kellems' personal corr(lSpondence to and from von Zedlitz.

Cof:fee stated that Miss

Kellems addressed this "N11zi agent" as "My· darling boy" and
signed her lettex·s to him with "All my love, sweetheart,
Vivien."

This was exrJlosive!

A United States Congressman

had somehow come into possession of' an American d.tizcn' s
private correspondence,.and then made that correspondence
public,

There was only one ultimate source for these

excerpts from this lady's priv-ate correspondence ··- the U. S.
Office of' Censorship, or one of its cooperating agencies.
Concl.uci:Lng his characterization of Miss Kellems as a

" • • • tool of the Goebbels propaganda machine [and] the
].over o:f a HitJ.er fifth column spy • , , ," Congressman
Coffee thr'm cl.e:fen:ed further critic ism, citing ". , , the

66

.

,5L?J]J!;E2§E]c2.!.1~~

Pt. 90, 1\o, 3, p. 33o9.

:1~~s .•

67

Recox-:9,, 78th Gong., 2nd Sess. ( 19frlf) ,

p. 3370.
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rules of etiquette and the spirit of fair.play

• •

"

Coffee refrained from further disclosure of !'lliss Kellems's
private correspondence with von Zedlitz, because, he said, it
afforded him", •• no pleasure to refer to the personal life
. a crl. t•
o f any 1 a d y Ul.
·lca l . way," 68

Vivien Kellems immediately protested this invasion of
her privacy and an invesUgation was launched l.Jy the Senate
--c-ommittee-on-Post-Off'ices and Post Roads.

that crossed the borders of the United States was subject to
compulsory censorship, and this included the Kellems-Zed.litz
letters.

In addition, Zedlitz was a known German national

living in Argentina; correspondence between he and any person
in the United States would receive strict su.r,loillance :from
poGtal censors.

l'-1isB Kellems logically charged that someone

in the Of:fice of CensOl'sh.i.p, or in some other government
agency to which Censorship intercepts had been sent, had
leaked her private corr.espondence to unauthorized ind.i vi duals
and that these individuals had illegally disclosed portions
of her letters to Pearson and Coffee,

1'he Senate Committee

concurrecl.
Byron Price, as Director of the Office of Censorship,
was the first witness to testify before a sub--committee
dling the .investigation.

han~

Price expressed his belief that the

Kellems--Zedlitz correspondence had been leaked by some government a.gency other than the Office of Censorship.

68

Il:l.2:• •

P• 3.37L

He empha-

\

40

sized the fact that other goverrunent agencies were privy to
Censorship intercepts.

Under order of a subpoena, Price

produced in executive session copies of' the Kellerns-Zedlitz
correspondence, but because these intercepts contained secret
censorship markings they were not made available in public
session.

I

1------j

!

~-

In December, 1944, Vivien Kellems said that she

believed she knew how the intercepts were leaked to Pearson
and-Coffee and offered to state these beliefs to tho

SLlb-

The sub-committee, however,

committee in executive session.

requested that she testify in public session.

She refused

and the Senate Committee dropped its investigation without
submitting a re11ort, 69 Kellems contended that the I{oosevel t
admin.ist:raticm

purposel~r

leaked her correspondence in

reta1iation for her opposition to government policies.7°
On May 23, 191+1+, Price testified that Zedlitz had
communicated with a number of persons in the United States.7 1
However, Vivien Kellems -was the only one of these persons
whose correspondence was leaked and made public.

She was

also the only one of these persons who had publicly
criticized the administration.
the importance of including in

Price was questioned about
Genso1~sl1ip

intercepts such

personal phrases as "My darling boy" and "All my love,
sweetheart,"

69

His answers largely evaded the question,

JJ.S:EE'.'f:i.:..}2.:l.._!!!2__Q:t£Lce o(, Ce!.J_SOJ?~hh?., pp. l.J-11+.

7°Koop, _5Jl'..:.-9.Lt., , p. 13'?.
71I£.iq. • p. 1J8.

41
~-'here

were only three agencies that received the

Kellems-Zedli tz intercepts: British Censorship, the Office of
Strategic Services, and the State Department.

Neither

British Censorship nor the Office of Strategic Services were
questioned by the sub-committee,

The State Department, how-

ever, testified that it had distributed the intercepts to at
least two other subordinate agencies.

1'hese two agencies

---,------roper-ted -tha-t--their copies of the Kellems-Zndlitz intercepts_

had been destroyed,7 2
So the leak was never official.ly discovered.- The
Kellems affair was closed.

Vivien Kellems absolved Byron

Price of any guilt, implying that he was following instructions from higller authority, 73

According to Byron .Frice, the

Director of ·the Office of Censorr;hip was ", , , responsible
only to the" Commander-In-Chief himself ,

'

"

0

"7

~-

During the Kellems investigation _:L'ime magazine
reported that "

. . all Washington knew-that

someone in the

Office of Censorship slipped the juicier portions of the

72 .
.
Ibld., pp.
1)8-139. These intercepts from the
·Office of Cerisorshi:p to other government agencies all bore
the following notice: '".Che attached information was taker1
from private communications, and its extremely confidential
character nmst be preserved, The :i.nfon11ati.on must be
c:on:fided only to ·those officials whose knowledge of it is
necessary to the prosecution of the war. In no case should
it bG widely distributed, or copies made, or the information
used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without
express consent of the· Director of Censorship," Cited in
~orl....2.E~_:~~--Pf:J:Lce _££._ Censors!ljc:P.• p, '7.
-

?"i-Koqp, op. c:it., p. 11+2.

?4 Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.
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Kellems-von Zedlits Correspondence to columnist Drew Pearson
and Representative Coff'ee,"75

Price, however, was·satisf'i.ed
that ". • • no one in Censorship was to blame ...7 6 He

contacted Drew Pearson and personally asked him" . • • to
refrain from publishing any more such material and none
appeared in print thereafter ... ??

According to Byron Price,

"The censors take every precaution to keep the mail as secure
-possible

.. 78

In the Kellems ca_ge,

someone failed.
The Office of Censorship acted as an intelligence
gathering agency which dispensed confidenthtl information to
other agencies of the government.

Thus the Department o:f

State, thB F.B.I., the Army, and many other government
depr~rtments,

would request that the Office of Censorship

provide them with information the;v felt was important to
their operations.

The various government agencies would tlwn

"act" upon the information provided by the Office of Censor .•
ship.

In the ear-ly years of the war these "acting agencies,"

as they were collectively called, often exercised their
privileged right to Censorship intelligence to the fullest
extent.

Indeed, some agencies, and particularly the State

75"'I'he Administration: l''aithless," 'I'~e._, April 17,
1941+, p. 23.
7 6Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971.
'??Ibid.

?BQ uo ~<A~ d 1n
. El
. an d Byron P. rlce,
'
o .mer Dav1s
War
Inf'oiJ~ia!io:~.!l,~~.~-~-l:!S2E~J7Jr ~Washington, D.C.:. AmerTcim
Eounc1~ on Publ1o Affalrs, L194J]), p. 6J,
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Department, the Army, and the F',B.I., requested that the
Office of Censorship provide them with all information of a
suspicious nature, even though that information had no
apparent relationship to the agency making the request.

In

effect, these agencies wanted, and in the first months of the

I

war received, free and full access to Censorship intelligence.
B:y-:r·on Price soon became concerned with the practice

1----- --orproviding-ul'1limited

information to these actlng agencies

and decided to incorporate a new policy within his office,
Price had made a visit to some offices of the Department of
State and discovered "stacks" of Censorship intercepts
excerpts from the private correspondence of American
ci tizenr~ -·· in m;_locked storer·oomc.

He then ded.decl that the

number of int.e:ccr>pts provided to these acting agencies would
be limited to only those that the Office of Censorship felt
the acting agency required.

Blanket requests for information

from the F.B.I. and the Army were denied, and each request
for information received from these agencies was then decided
on its individual requirements.

The tendency of these acting

agencies to request more confidential information than they
actually required was a problem with which Byron Price had to
deal for the duration of the war. ?O~
Postal censorship continued to .:function, even though
the Kellems affa.ir was somewhat embarrassing.

:there were

791'he above information on the re la tionshi.p betwGfm
the Office of Censorship and other government agencies based
on interview with Norman Carlt>on, January· 11, 1972.
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other times when postal censorship came underfire.

lViany· of

these instances involved postal censorship of the press and
will be treated under the subject of voluntary censorship in
this paper.
Two months before General Eis-enhower's forces landed
on the beaches at Normandy postal censors took special
precautions with mail going to servicemen overseas.

These

precau.-tions- include-d -stringent censorshil)

United States to servicemen overseas, and"

• . an arbitrary

ten-day delay • . • " of mail coming to the United States from
"l"t
. Europe. 80
~ ary personne 1 ~n

m~

"When the Director Ol'dered

all mail from servicemen in England impounded during a short
period before D-Day he_ was showered with inquirie8 and protests but received [only] a single x·eally al)U.sive letter. " 81
Following V-E Day postal censorship of mail to Europe was
relaxed and postal censors concentrated their effod;s on the
war with Japan in the PaciJic,
There was another form of compulsory censorship that
deserves some mention.

Military censorship had been in

effect since Pearl Harbor.

While military censorship was an

effort independent of the Off'ic:e of Censorship, the functions
of the two censoring agencies often overlapped and ccmflicted
with one another.

Further sections of this paper will touch

upon military censorship as it came into contact -- and

80

~9..£G

81

on the_Q.ff:l_ce

O!:_C.~l2.i?,El'SI')j.J?.,

pp, 14-15,

rsyron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.

conflict -- with the Office of Censorship.

But a brief view

of military censorship is in order here before the reader
moves on to those sections.

'l'he Army and Navy retained censorship jurisdiction
over thei.r personnel ancJ. ove1· journalists operating in the
---------

·theaters of v<ar.

All mail from servicemen overseas past>ed

through either Army or Navy censorship before it was dis-·
patched to the United States.
watch for and delete any

These military censors had to

refEn~ence

to the location of mili-

tary personnel, units, or equipment.

Soldiers and sailors

were seldom allo·N<ld to tell their families where they were,
MiLi.tHry CE'nsors

~""'>re

stationed at vrcrious maLL dispatch

poin.ts wherever troops were located.

Each Navy censor· n,acl.

an average of' thirty letters per day mailed by sailors.
Thetoe letters averaged two thousand words each, so that each
Navy censor read about sixty thousand words each day.
According to one source, out of sixty thousand words read
daily, only ten would have to be deleted by the censor. 82
This type of censorship activity was the daily ritual of
military censors.

~-'here

were other a.g,t.ivi ties by military

censors that could not be called daily ritual.
American correspondents with military units overseas
had to sign agreements that they would submit all of their
8~'

--,James D. Johnson, We Censors are Frustrated
Hmnnns," §::::.~:u~<:J,.§:.'Ll~.:Y-~2.~!l£"~..,}'Of2~~. September 22, 1945, p.

Jl+.

material to mili.tP..ry censorship before it was dispatched.
Civilian censorship in the United States usually utilized a
rule such as "Will the publication of this material help the
enemy?"

Military censors, both at horne and abroad, usually

added another guideline, such as "Is publication of this
material good for the Anily?"SJ
'~I

Therefore, military censors

could justify suppresrd.on of nearly any material they· did not

j_______ -- --v:ant

I
I

strateg.i,c

value~

Using this rule military censors often adopted rather
str:Lc·i; policies,

One Army General in Cairo in the summer of

l.91+Li- called in the correr;pondents in his area and delivered
the following lecture to them,
l\ly m.LL.i.tary censors are going to examine
eve:rythinc; you write about this theater,
whet..twr it; concerns politics or anything
olc;e, 'Hw:ce wLU be nothing eri tical of
th5.s theater sent out o·f here by you
gentlemen. If any of you think he may
be inclined to write anything critical,
he may as well leave now, And don't go
complaining to the War Depa:c·tment. I
don't intend to have any interference
in my theater. Sl.f
Some reporters attempted, by cable and by letter.', to relay
the General's remarks to friends and

emplo~y·ers.

These cable:3

and letters were summarily stopped on the General's orders.
Another case of military cem;ort>hip concerned the
infamous soldier-slapping incident involving General George
In August of 1943 General Patton visited a field

Patton.

SJ~h.oop,
·
814.

QUlTtPd

't
~-£2::..-.
'

•

, p, 261
, ,
'

J.n Erlc SevareJ.d, "CenBorship :i.n the

Saddle," .tJ~t. !·.:\:52.:'~· April 11+, 19'1·5, p. IJ.16.
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hospital in Sicily where he came upon a soldier who was
physically unhurt, but suffering from "nerves."

Patton

became enraged, called the soldier a "dirty no-good son of a
bitch," a "coward," and "a disgrace to the Army," 8 5 Patton
then slapped the soldier's face, telling him he would either
be sent to the front lines to fight, or be shot by a firing
squad of his fellow soldiers.

------T.lke- wHcf.:.fire.

News of the incident spread

G€meral Eisenhower, in his book

f~l'l-~d,E?,~IJ~

states that no effort was made to suppress news of
the incident. 86 However, it was some months after the

;g;uro~,

incident before the American public read the story. 87
According to Theodore Koop, who was the Assistant Director of
the Office of CerwonJhip, military authori tics tried to
nuppress the Patton incid(mt even after it had reached the
United States.

Koop says the Off.iee of Censorship declined
to rule against publication and the story was printed. 88
Journalists in the United States also had to contend

with military censors whose rulings were often difficult to
comprehend,

One such incident

t~1ok

place in 191+2 when a

group of correspondents were invited by the government to
8 5Quoted in Richard R. Lingeman, Don.•t You K11ow

Ther'e's A War On?

The Amroriean Home Front,--T9lf1--19ir5 ... (New

Yoi:j'C-;~-I~ ,-p-;-·;o\itriam's-s 6i1s , 'T9 7oT;-})"j)7'"~29 9- :Ji:To ; s ee-·ais o
Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's sto1·y (New

J~.i brary,

l9 51) ,

pji;-:-To5·-I 1)8~-----·"

Yorl~t

86
Dwight D. Eisenhfwer, f!~ll'!~.~ In
City: Doubleday & Co., 19 f8), p. l8c.•
87Ibid.
88KooiJ, P.P:....cL~.

Popular

I~g::.:·op~

(Garden
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make a tour o:t' war plants.

At one plant the reporters were

allowed to view and later describe in detail a new fifty
caliber machine gun then in production.

However, when their

stories were submitted to military censors all reference to
the ealiber of the ammunition for this gun was summarily
0

blue-penc~led!

89

The irate reporters a.lso protested the

fact that the censored informa,tion was passed intact in news-

military censors replied that because the reporters' newspapers had a wider circulation than the local pa11ers censorship of the information in question was justified,90
Incidents such as these were often the result of
attempts by overz.ealous military eensors to protect the war
eff'ort of the;, United Sta.tes.

Such stringent censorship

motivated Byron Price to d.:Lsavow the
tary· censors,

autJ:wri·~y

of some m.i.li-

In late 191+J he issued the following statement

to newspaper publishers:
I solicit your continued cooperation to
see . , • that a dangerous psychology of
overcensorship is not created throughout
the land by the activities of a miscellany
of' volunteer f'iremen.91
Price was concerned that reporters and publ:Lshers might be
censoring to·o much material at the reque:st of military
cem:ors who had the "morale" of the Army in mind rather than

8

9"Censorship
Fanta· uNJ.·a," "'~J..E!__e,
July 8 ' 19''2
..,._,
p. 64 •

90lb:Ld.
9lQuoted in Koop, .<:JJl..c ci -~. , p. 26/t.

the strategic value of the material i tsel.f'.

There were many

incidents of overzealous military censorship, some of which
will be recounted in the chapter on voluntary censorship.
Compulsory censorship was the first line of defense in
the wa1' on words from 1942-1945. Censorship was a military
weapon9 2 designed to deprive the enemy of information,
friends, and commodities that he could urJe against the Allies;

was- also

it

used- t6 collect intelligence that cou]..;l be

against the enemy.93

Perhaps this section on compulsory

censorship can close on a humorous note.

Censors had

to keep a close watch on the possibility of enemy agen·tE:
using carrier pigeons to transmit mHssages. 9~·

Researeh

failed to tHrn up evidence of o;hotgun-carrying ceneo1:c
scanning the ski8s,

The

ne~t

chaptel' deals with voluntary censorship of

the American press and radio.

This "delie:ate and explosive"

task required less than one percent of the budget and
personnel of the Office of Censorship.95

It also required a

tremendous amount of perserverance and patience from the
people of the press, the radio, and the Of':fice of Censorship,

p' 2'

93£1:eport~p tl]~_Q,ffice o_L9m~Esh~E• p,
91+c

1.

· 1 s were ser1om;
·
·
·
ensors h.lp o·£'±'.
. J.c1a
concerrnng
thls
possibility; see Davb and Price, .2£_~_Eit,, p. 65.
9 5Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.
~

IV
VOLUNTARY CENSORSHIP:
THE SECOND LINE OF DEPENSE
The Voluntar;y: Codes
When President Roosevelt chose Byron Price as the
Director of the Office of Censorship, he instructed him to
", , , coordinate the voluntary effort of press and radio to
withhold from circulation information which would aid the
enemy in his p:cw;<ecution of the war," 1
shi.p had to beco1•1e a cleton·ing

hous~J

The Office of Censor-

for information

disseminated by thousands of radio stations, newspapers, and
other journals throughout the country.

It had to request

that these publishers and broadcasters withhold, at the discretion of the government, any information that might pre ju ..
dice the United States and Allied forces in their prosecution
of the war; at the same time it had to guarantee the consti.,
tuticma.l rights of free speech and a free press,
theoretically, an almost impossible position.

This was,

According to

Byron Price, there was one rule that had to be observed if
voluntary censorship was to succeed:

"Censorship of the

dissemination of public infor·rnation must hold U.'1ceasingly,

..,,.,_,_,,._.

_______
.

1Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.
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day in and day out, to the single purpose of keeping
dangerous information from the enemy." 2 The only alternative
was, obviously, compulsory censorship.

Nearly everyone

loathed the idea of imposing compulsory censorship on the
press and radio, and the Office of Censorship wasted little
time in issuing voluntary censorship codes for these media.
~'he

first voluntary codes, the C£2·e _g:f War:dm"' P::-ac;;.-

-------- tices- fo-:c--Ameri-can --Broadcasters and the Code of Wartime

--·

----~-·

----~-~--~-

Pr§_~tice:~~Am::rican

194·2.3

·---·----·-·-'----"~

]':t:_('JSS, were issued on January

15,

It is worthwhile to describe these codes in depth.

( 1)

News Programs

'> '
( G)

Acl-I,:i.b Programs

( J)

Foreign J"anguagc Programs

In disseminating certain material b:coadcaster<> were advised
to ask themselves "Would this material be of value to me if I
were the enemy?" 4 The code requested that the following
elements of news programs be kept off the air unless that

2
Historical Heports on War Administration, A H.E)J:>OJ?.!
on the Office of Censorship (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Govern-men-i"Pr"l11'ETri'f;·151'1Tce-;l:97+SY, p. 2; hereafter referred to as
Heport__2I!:..._!.he O~fice _of C2_(:E.~~ors[lit.

3u. s. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime
Practices for American Broadcasters, -·pr<Iffi'on ofJanuary l.5.,
1942]-( wasJ1:lngfon-,-D .c-::~-u-;-·s·.--·crov'ernment [Printing Office]) ,
f1942]; hereafter referred to as Code for Broadcasters
\1-15-42); and u. s. Office of Censorsh:lp-;---cc;·a:e-·ar wartime
Practices for the American Press, [Ecli tion oi,....JiiinuaryT~
1942] rviar;hii'i;sCtori~-D ."C:--:!U.-s .-Government Printing Office) ,
1942; hereafter referred to as f_9_de _}.£E.J:he JC._ress (1 .. 15-42) ,
I

's_;oq_e

for Bro;c~_de<::.9!5!!S ( 1 .. 15o.Lf2), p. 2.
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information had been released by appropriate <mthori ty:
weather reports, including temperature and barometer
readings, wind directions, forecasts, ·and "all other data"
relating to weather conditions; and the location, movement,
identity, strength of, or information concerning troops,
ships, planes, experiments, fortifications, industrial war
· _ - ___________

l.

-~r. oduc:t:i.on, c:asuali ty lists, selective service enrollments,
H"'~-''V>.;
-~f'ar-.11; +i aQ 5

••- V-.l.-

.,. ........
__ r.r._+{AY"Irt
VJUJIH..'.J.!-1.\...oCI,; 1.1.1.. >:IJ.-J.u-

I.;

,<:-~...;, ""-'_.._-.... ~;.....,._,....., •

Radio broadcasters were cautioned not to give
credence to unconfirmed reports of any kind.

These included
ship sin!dngs, enemy claims, and obvious fallacies, 6 These

reports were to be broadcast only after official confirmation
hy the Office of
A

Cenr~orship

or otheJ:

ap~propriate

authority.

general provis.i.on requested that radio stations not

disclose the nEJw location of the National Archives, which had
been moved, or movements of "bhe President of the United
States or of any military or diplomatic missions.

The code

also requested that broadcasters remove or seriously curtail
the following types of ad-lib radio programs:
(a)

H.equest programs

(b)

Quiz programs

(c)

Porurns al}.d Interviews (ad lib)

(d)

Commentaries and descriptions (ad lib) 7

pp. 2-3·
p. 3.
p. 4.
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Radio stations were asked to suspend for the duration of the
war the acceptance of telephoned or telegraphed requests for
musical selections.

It was feared these requests, if honored,

could be used as open codes by enemy agents.

Mail requests

for musical selections could be accepted only if radio
stations were careful not to play the selections on the day

I

4---

and time requested.

I,ost and found requests were to be

-hC>IlOred Only Oll \qritten teqUe St 1 not by telephone o

Quiz

programs that involved audience participation were to be
discontinued or carefully supervised, for it was felt that
public accessabili ty to open mi.cro1)hones was dangerous,
especially when there were no prior arrangements for investigating the bacl.q;;round of the participants.

'rhi.s restriction

vlas mainly dil"'ect:ed to nman ... in~. ._the~~streetu interviews

t

but

simil;;r rea. sons v;ere given for eliminating or restricting
forums and commentaries. 8
Broadcasters were requested to maintain full transcripts of all foreign language programs, and to guard
against any deviation from these scripts by foreign language·
announcers and performers (any language other than English
was considered a foreign language),

Broadcasters were also

". • • a.dvised to steer clear of dramat:i.c programs which
attempt to portray the horrors of' combat • , • , .. 9

It was

felt that such dramatic·programs might be too realistic and

8

.

Ibi~ .• pp.

5-6.

9;lbid. ' p. 7.
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have an adverse effect on radio listeners.
This initial code for broadcasters could not foresee
all future possibilities and therefore was not to be interpreted as containing all possible restrictions on the use of
the domestic radio system.

If broadcasters doubted any

material being considered for programming they were advised
to contact the Office of Censorship for clarification.

the Code for

Bro~dcaste~,

superceded and consolidated a

miscellany of requests previously made by various agencies of
the Federal Governrnent. 10 This first press code generally
repeated the same restrietions enumerated in the radio code
of tho same date,

Information

Y'(~gar~ting

troops r

ships~

planes, industrial wal' production, and ·the location of
faetoX'J.es c:ou.ld :·Jot be reportcJcl. in America.n newspapers unless
that information had been released for publication by
official authority.
Newspapers were asked to exclude weather forecasts
and weather "round-up" reports unless they had been released
by -the Weather Bureau,

Routine weather foreoasts printed by-

any single newspaper oould cover- only the State in which the
paper was printed, ". • • and not mo1·e thah four.· adjoining
States, portions of which lie within a radius of 150 miles
from the point of publication." 11

1°Code for the Press (1-15-42), p. 1.
--·~-•v-·-~---~·~•
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The exclusion of weather news would, according to the
Office of Censorship, deprive the enemy of the ability to
forecast weather conditions in parts of the United States.
Enemy naval craft operating in the Atlantic carried
experienced meteorologists as senior officers.

l

Radio

broadcasts of currcmt weather reports from as few <:fl three
well-separated Western :points could effectively provide theBe

L_ __ ~----enemy meteorologists with enough .information to forecast

Eastern weather conditions.

For example, "•

• a few drops

of rain at El Paso, high winds at KansaEl City, and a snowfall
in Detroit will indicate to enemy ships which parts of tho
[East] coa.st will have rough weather or fog a day or two
later," 12
But it

W<l.>o

difficul:l; to use this line of reasoning to

justify the excll:ts:i.on of weather news in newspapers.

An

enemy agent who read a weather forecast in a newspaper would
still have to communicate this information to his comrades at
sea.

In the case of a weather forecast by radio the communi.,.

cation would be nearly instantaneous, the need for the agent
eliminated, and the exclusion of the forecast justified.
Censorship regulations excluding weather news in newspapers
was recognized as illogical by many publishers and received,
at best,

hal:f~heartcd

compliance.

12nirector of the Office of Censorship, PR-36,
[Press Relet<_se No. 36_] (Washington, D.C.: u. s.-OITTce of
Censorship, October 29, 191-1-2), p, 6; hereafter these Censor ..
ship press releases shall be referred to as Censorshir) Press
Re}e_?.se N~·---• (date).
-------~----·-
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'l'his first press code contained a :restriction against
the publishing of pictures or maps that were related to those
subjects excluded from publi.cation. 1 3 A general provision
requested that there be no publication disclosing the
location of the National Archives or the movements of the
President of the United States or of military or diplomatic
missions,

Anytime a publisher suspected material being

------considered f-or-publ-ication he was dirGcted to contact the

Office of Censorship for clarification.

Also, i f a publisher

doubted the authority of any official who requested the
exclusion of any material being considered for publication,
he was urged·to contact the Office of Censorship at once.

11+

Following the issuance of these first two codes for
the :prer>s and radio, By:r·on Price frequently emphasized the
importance o:f complying with voluntary censorship.

In April

of 191+2 Price appeared before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and made the following statement,
It is a happy circumstance that the President
of the United States has put his confidence
in your patriotism and your understanding, and
has turned his back on those who agree that
only eompulsory censorship can be effective.
It will be an unhappy day for all of us i.f it
is found that that confidence was misplaced,
I personally do not believe that such a day
will come. Whether it does is up to you,l:S

1 3code· f
th P ress (1 - 15 - 42)
----~r --~'
· , p. 3 •
p • lj..

i5Quoted in Robert E. Summers (comp,), Wartime
Censorsh:ij: of' Pres.s and Radio (New Yorl<: H. W:-vrrrson
Company, i942l, pp·;--yr.:)s:---
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A few weeks later Price stood before the .A.nnual Convention of
the National Association of Broadcasters and said:
• • , the success or failure of voluntary cooperation in broadcasting will depend upon the
degree of control which patriotic broadcasters ,
exercise over the operation of their stations,16
These emotional appeals, however, did not silence publishers
and broadcasters.

Criticism of censorship regulations and

requests was :frequent and often hard--hitting.

Many editors

felt that the government used official censorship to cover
up mistakes and to mislead the American public.
War News
. . Censored.

-~----, --~----~~c•-'•-

News of the progression of the

war was issued by the government and this allowed the govern··
ment to issue or withhold news at :its discretion.

President

Roosevelt, res:ponding to a reporter's query as to whether .or
not the Office of Censorship should a1.1ow "bad" news to be
printed in newspapers, replied:
Bad news should be passed out obviously just
as much as good news, just as soon as it
doesn't affect military operations. 'l'here
i.s only one reason for withholding bad news
and th~:t i.s that i t might affect military
operatlons and cause more bad news , , • • 17
Many edi. tors and broadcasters charg(:>d the government wi. th
providing an inaccurate picture of the war by withholding
"bad news" until i"C could be balanced with the sirau1taneous
16
cens.s>EEl'.it! PEess
PP• 1-2.
1

Releas~,...B.£.!_.Lf~,

May 11, 1942,

7From Franklin n. Hoosevelt, Press Conference,
May 22, 1942, in Samuel I. Hosenman (comp.), The Public
Papers and Addresses of .Franklin D. Hoosevelt-; 19lj:2\foT,
\i~ewYoi~·rc;tis.rper ,;i1ifBi:~·oFhe1-::s ·rsU'G1Ts.he-rs ,-I95o), p. 251.
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.

j

release of "good news." ·
tender

;r:,a~]L

8

In February of .191+2 the aircraft

was sunk by Japanese dive bombers near Java

with the loss of seven hundred American 1:\.ves and thirty-two
airplanes that were on board the ship.

News of the loss was

not released until April, more than thirty days after the
;I:angle;y: had gone down. 19

Time magazine also cr:i.ticized the delays in reporting
war news t-o- t:he- A1nerican public

&

The Navy vvaited sixty-=fi ve

days to announce the loss of three American cruisers
Quincy, the

Vince1~nes,

~·-

the

and the Astor.if.!: --- while 'the

Australian Government waited only ten days to announce the
loss of their cruiser, the

Canb~!:E~·

sunk in the saws action,

'J:he U. S, losses were announced by the American Government
only later with the news of the sinking of six. enemy ships

in another action separated by both time and space f:cmn the
U. S. losses.

.1'i.me stated that ". • • long delays in

announcing sinkings may not have always been justified by
reasons of military security ,

. ," and that these delays

and carefully considered joint releases of "good" and "bad"
news gave the American people the wrong impression of the
. the war. 20
progress of the United States J.n

·1.B.,r,\o lb.
Cr1't'1c1.zes
·
J
April 18, 1942, p. lJ.

i9News story from "Editor and PubLisher," April 25,
1942, p. 86, reprinted in Summers, .Cll?.!..-.~.:Lt.• , pp. Hl5-188; see
also Jam(~fJ !Via.cGregor Burns, Roosevelt: 1'he Soldier of Freedom
(New York: Harcourt Brace JovariovTci'Ii-;··fii.c-:·;-'T970T.- J:,-,-··22J;---20"Wl·lat Pr1.ce
·
?
·
•Secrecy."
JHl:.':,
November 9 , 1,.9 i·t2,

PP• 61-62.
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In some cases news of American losses was denied
immediate publication even when that news was common
knowledge,

Hundreds of persons living on the Atlantic coast

of Florida near Palm Beach", , , heard several explosions
and saw flames at sea." 21 Quite obvious1y, a sea battle was
in progress, later known to be between
Allied ships.

a.

German U-boat and

The battle began on a Saturday evening.

By
view

-------------t-he --next-- mo-rning- people v.rere driving

the upturned hulks of the incapacitated ships, and reporters
were waiting to interview the Allied survivors as they
scram1Jled ashore on the Florida beaches.

The Navy refused to

allow Florida papers to print any news or reference to the
s:i.nkings.
~;unk,

1\iot until a full week after the first ship was

cmd only a:t'ter strong protests from editors and

publishers, did the Navy release a news item covering the
sinkings.

In another case a British steamer was sunk by a

German U-boat a few miles from Puerto Rico with the loss of

many American lives.

Even though the survivors were seen

coming ashore at Puerto Rico, and even though the Canadian
press re:ported the sinking, the U. S. Navy refused to allow
publication of the story in the American press·for more than
two days, and only then after preBsure was brought to bear on
the Navy Department. 22 The Navy later apologized for the

21
Arthur Robb, editorial in "Editor and Publisher,"
. t e d u1
. s ummers, .91!..!..-C.: :L. 't. , p. 16
March 17' 191<·?.,
"'- p. · J~6 , reprln
. 9,
22Editorial in "Editor and Publisher,,; January Jl,
p. 22, reprinted in _ibid., pp. 1?'+--176.
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"confusion" over the incident but included this admonition in
its announcement:
No newspaper or news service should publish
any report or information of ships sunk or
damaged by enemy action until such information has been cleared for release • • • ,
even though the incident may be within the
view of shore observers • , , ,23
1'he wi thholrJ.ing of this and similar news items was justified,
a_CC()J:'Cling_to_the Office of Censorship, because publication of
a ship sinking, even though it is within sight of American
beaches, would assist", . . an attacking commander • • . to
gauge the effect of his fire. Enemy comma.nders should not be
aided in this task. " 24 But this justification was difficult
to accf.,pt in the face of further censorship efforts.

Even

when a fire broh:e out on an .Ame:cican ship in port in New York,
with smoke
millions, ,

ne

. . billowing

across Manhattan, to be seen by

•• " 25" the Navy refused to a 11 ow plctures
.
of th,::

fire or the damaged ship to be

tal~:en,

and delayed publication

of the story until New York editors and publishers raised a
storm of protest. 26 !VIany persons, including some members of
Congress, began publicly protesting governrnent efforts at
news suppression, and the practice of "sugar-coating" bad

2

p.

J.

3News story in "Editor and Publisher," January Jl.,
p. 71, reprinted in ibid., pp. l77-l7H.
24c·
6 October 29, 19 4 2,
...:..~2.£.~..h'
2:1~... I,ress Re 1 eas..~~~12·
2

.5vvalter E; Schneider, news story in "Editor and
Publi:;;hcr," February 14, 19h2, p. 9, repr.i.nted in Smnmers,
.9!'..!.-Cl ~, , p. 1H1.
26
rbid., pp. 181.-182,
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news. 2 7

Others expressed an opinion, widely held, that the

government was providing only one side of the war news,
thereby obscuring the seriousness of the war and promoting
complacency while at the same time chastising the public and
the news media for being complacent and apathetic. 28

Much of

this censorship bungling could be traced directly to the

L ____ _

zealous efforts of military authod ties,

over~

The Of:flce of

-censorshTt'l ,- i:uider- ihe leadership of' Byron Price, often denied
the requests of military officials to suppress news in the
domestic press. 29
Not all military officials attempted to impose
unwarranted censorship.

Some, lilw General Douglas MacArthur,

felt that it was "• • , essential that the public know the
tr'u.-'t-.h...• "JO

n.<<'mera.
.
·t DWJ.g
. h ·.t "".
~lfoen.h ower,
comJncn t.lng on

censorship of

wa:~·

tl1e

news in the United States said, "I do not

believe that speculation by self-styled military analysts
in the homelands, far removed from a theater_of operations,
is of any great benefit to the enemy ... 31

2 7"Sugar Coating Assailed," New York Times,
Februar'y 211-, 191+2, p. 18; see also "1\a:tr--·ui~ges!ilotto
'Military Action,'" _tJe_Y.i_YO£k 1't!1_1~~~· Febr-uary 13, 19Lf2, p. 14.
ZR...d'•. 1-.ln_ "N
k .T.
~.!:'~ J.vorla~
1ew y.or},.
.J.mes. " M
Nay 25 , 194
.
2-,
repr·inted in Summers, o:e.:_ cit., pp. 225-:o27.
Z9News story in "United States News," February 6,
1942, p. 17, reprinted in J:-bid., p. 130.
JOGeneral Doug:Las MacArthur, statement made on
2J, 1942, (pioted in ibid., p. 1+1,
JlDwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In EuroJ?e (Garden

City: Double day & company, Inc.-,l949)-,-p.-·n:;9 .
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Racial conflicts censored.

Eisenhqwer also related

that military censors in England had denied correspondents
the right to publish stories of racial conflicts between
white and black American soldiers.3 2 The English, according
to the General, most often accepted American Negro soldiers
as equals, and Negro soldiers oftei1 dated white English girls.
i

'.rhis, he said, often infuriated intolerant white American

~------.---------s-o-ld-iers,--- and--resulted

in frequent brawls::

The white G.I.

was", •• further bewildered when he found that the British
press toolc a firm stand on the side of the Negro ... 33

When

Eisenhower revoked the censorship ban on stories of th.ese
racial brawls he found that most American correspondents
favored retention of tbe ban .in order to protect against

IVIi:U tary censors in the United States also favon)d

ba1ming or, when this was not possible, playing dOVv11 racial
conflicts at home.

On Apri.l 3, 1942, a race-riot broke out

at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

An argument between a white and

et

black soldier suddenly exploded into a small-scale battle.
Nearly seventy-five soldiers, using rifles and pistols,
limited war· for hours, resulting in thr,~e
dead and several wounded.J 4 'l'he Army, with support from the

conducted their

O\'m

Offic" of Censorship, refused to allow publication of the

·---·--32Ib"
_ l d . ' P• 58.
3-3_rb_..?;_.,
·d
P• :J"9
4
3 "Armh Board Sifts Fort Di.x Shooting,"
April ~. 1942, p. 14.
I

New_X?rl~

6J
story by radio broa.dcast.35

Newspapers b<?gan publishing news
of the incident the following day,3 6 and the riot was soon

general public Jmowledge, 37

Emphasizing that Axis propa-

gandists capitalized upon racial difficulties in the United
merely
States,3 8 the Army described the race-riot as "

..

a brawl and without racial signifi'cance."39

This "brawl"

that was without racial significance motivated the Army to
:_,__ ,,
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Dix until completion of an inquiry into the disturbance.
Referring to a similar black-white incident at a camp in
Louisiana some months earlier, the Office of Censorship
claimed that the Army had not acted without precedent w))en it
banned radio broa.d-cast of the .Fort D.i.x incident. 40
Norman Carlson, former Chief Postal Censor, justified
the suppression of news of racial disturbances.

Publicizing

these disturbances aided the enemy, he said, by providing

1
35News story in "Broadcasting," April 13, 191+2,
_£p~_sit., pp. 19Lf-195·
3 6 "Arrny Board Sifts For-t Dix Shooting," New Yorlr
.2J2..:..~ c :i. t .
--~--------

p. 4-8' reprinted in Summers,

3 '~s umm c r s , .9J!..:____c: .!::!~ • _

38•r·b.
d
,;,w,,'~'-~~

Q

~

p

10 ,.
t

/

;J

e

39"Army Board Sifts F'ort Dix Shooting," _tl~_ew Yt?rk:
~L!·
.
. .
l
op, cJ.' t • , pp. 191·f- 19 :;'- . For
addJ..tJ..ona.
information on the -Fo·rt-Dix rl.ot and other incidents of
ra.cial viol.enc.e durin/? the ,war ye;;rs, :;:e~ Burns, .2:12.,~... .02:.~.,
p. 388, and Hr~rvard SJ.tkoff, "Rac1al M1l1. tancy and Inter·racial Violence in the Second World War," The J·ournal o:f
Am~rt_c:.§.!UJistory, I, VIII (December, 1971) , ·6-61-ti'BT:--·~----·Li·O,,
..,ummers,
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them with ammunition for their propaganda weapons.

In

addition to suppressing news of racial disturbances, or riots,
Carlson justified Censorship's practice of deleting from
citizens' mail all statements that adversely described
political or social conditions in the United States during
.

Such letters were either incised or J.mpounded.

the war.

lH

It would appear that the Offi.ce of.' Censorship during

r-r- concentrated

- - -- - -world. war

on cover.ing up the symptoms or

manifestations of racial turmoil rather than attacking the
causes.

Attempts to cover up these incidents merely provided

fuel for Axis propagandists; if the government had done something to eliminate the causes of the tunnoil there could have

'l'hat the 8ffice of Censon;;hi.p concurred i.n the
snppression of nc,ws of racial dissension may be indicated by
another case a year after the Fort Di.x disturbance.

In April

of 1911.3 British correspondent .Alex Faulkner, in a cable from
the United Stat<;s to England, referred to Erskine Caldwell' f3
novel,

r~<:!.~.:.§..lct..:t.:.l].§ Ac_E:~.

'fhe reference was promptly deleted

by cable censors, evoking this question from Faulkrlflr: "1'o
win the war is it necessary to make the people of England
think that there are no depressed economic groups and no race

.

.

problems J.n the UnJ.ted States?"

42

The answer must have been

41 Base d on persona. l l.n
. t ervJ.ew
.
January 11, 1972.

'+h
Wl"

Norman Car J.son, .

42
· Alex Faulkner, "How Tough is American Censorship?"
Harper~, April, 1943, pp. 502-509; quotation on p. 502.
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"Yes," for his very question was eliminated from his cable by
the censors!

Faulkner also reported that in February of 1943

the following anecdote was deleted by censors from a journalist's story: "Washington tells a story ,

of a clerk

who substituted for his own portrait on his War Department
identity badge that of Adolf Hitler, and wore it unchallenged
for a weel\.," leJ

Faulkner apparently f'el t tllat the Office of

Ceru30l's1tip-- -ha-d -not- lived up to Byron P-rice • s guarantee that

"Nobody shall ever be censored, or censured, for attacking a
censor." 44·

issued by the Of:lice o:f Censorship raised additional storms
of protest, espe0ially those regulations restricting tile
~'epor·r.in£;

of

we8.. l-her

news by the press a.nd radio,

1'he Office

of Censorship had requested that newspaper editors print only
those weather forecasts officially released by the Weather
Bureau. 4 5 Even more restrictive was the request that radio
stations carry no weather forecasts at all, except in cases
of emergency. 46 Thus, if it was snowing outside, the local
radio station would have to disregard it entirely, while
local papers could report -che snow only aftccr receiving permission from the Weather Bureau or the Office of Censorship.

66
These restrictions led to some rather ludicrous situations.
On Easter Sunday in 1942 a serious snowstorm blanketed much
of the Eastern United States.

The snow:fall in New·York was

heavy, but in Washington, D.C. it was even heavier.

1'he New

York Times published a story of a huge traffic tie-up in Washington due to the snowstorm there;

Censorship regulations

ret:tricted weather news in any one paper to a radius of' one
_______ h:undred.fifty miles of the city in which the paper was published. Lf7

Theref'ore, because the New.Jor_l.::__ Times. had printed

a story rela.ted to the snowfall in Washington, D.c,

, it could

not on the same day print any news about the snowfall in its
own city •. Some newspapers, with the approval of the Office
of' Censorship, published pictures of the snowfall without an
explanatory by--line,

Newspa:per editors were even advised by

Ctonsorship officials not to print the traditioi1al "groundhog" predictions of the coming of' spring.

One radio sports-·

caster, doing his best to abide by censorship regulations,
announced, during a late autcunn football game, that he could
not see the players on the field.

He judiciously withheld

the reason and his listeners had to determine for themselves

if it was rain, snow, or fog that was covering the playing
. l .d. ItS·
f1.e

In March of 1942 the Office of Censorship wi·thheld,

for a number of hours, news of a serious tornado which

4

7co_ci~~r:_Press,

(l-15-'+2), p. J.

48
For weather stories see Theodore Koop, !e_<l.:£?.ll.2!~
§.;;U:~nce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 191}6) ,
pp. T0?-108.

,~ ,~

0(

4
extended over three southern states and claimed 125 lives. ·9
In some cases if a radio station located two hundred miles
from the center of a storm received permission to report news
of that storm, then the local radio station at the storm
center could not report the storm to its listeners.5°

The

reason given for these restrictions was to deny aid and
comfort to the enemy, but there were those who felt that the
---------

phrase

wa~s

being given "

•• an exaggerated meaning to hide

incompetence,"5l
The phrase "aid and comfort" was used frequently to
suppress news articles.

One issue of Time_ required modiJJ. ..

cation at the request of.the Office of Censorship because it
carried '" story of the treatment of dysentery by a sulfa
·~2

drug,-··

1'h.e Gto:cy was eliminated because the Office of

Cem>ot'ship :frol t it would give aid and comfort to the enemy, 53
Censorship was going to get worse before it got better.
Total war: the "Official
Bill."
---- Secrets
..
,~-----

1'here were

those persons, including journalists, who supported even

4·9News story i.n "Variety," March 25, 19Lf2, p, 25,
reprinted.in

Summers,£~

cit,, pp, 197-199.

5° News . story in "Variety," May 20, J. 9~·2, p. 37,
reprinted in iJ;lj.d., p. 199.
51
·'Editorial by· David lawrence in "United States
News," .!"'arch 13, 19'4·2, pp, 22-·J, reprinted in ibid., pp.
215--216.
.
.
---

')
5'""Another
Sulfa Drug," 'J.'ime, f.\ay It, 19'+2, p, 32;

the story was eJ.iminated from export editions of this issue.
53 .. :r:i.me, Inc." (house organ) , May 18, 19'·f2, reprinted
in Summers, ££.:_ci::_t_., pp. 216-219.
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stricter censorship, in peace as well as

~n war. 54 Noted

joun1alist and writer William L. Shirer advocated the
suppression of the American fascist press because he felt its
philosophy was a hazard to freedom. 55

'I' he Director of the

Office of Facts and Figures, Archibald MacLeish, criticized
a "minority" of newspaper editors ·for their "defeatist"

I

attitudes toward the war policies of the administration,5
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"defeatist propaganda" rather than "democratic criticism ... 5?
"Fascist" and "defeatist" were phrases frequently used during
the war to describe newspapers, magazines -·· and people
that were critical of the Roosevelt administrations.
In .1\.prU of 19/.j-1 President Roosevelt offered this
public st.atern.ent concerning censorship:

Suppression of opinion and censorship of
news are among the mortal we2.pons that
dictatorships direct against their own
people and against the world. As far as
I am concerned there will be no govern-·
ment control of news unless ~t be of
vital military information.5
Roosevelt's public statements, however, were not always the
same as his private ones.

In a private letter to Winston

5'~Rel'.£.rt on the Q_f.fic..§__q.f_~-~.£1?hip, pp, J2- JJ.

55william Shirer, "Poison Pen," Atlantic, May, 19/.j·2,
pp. 548-552; an opposing view is D. Pontius·~Treedom for the
fascist press?" )_~_Repul?"1·i~, September 7, 1942, p. 287.
p. lJ.

56"Defeatist Press," New

York

Til~, April 18, 191+2,

57 Ibid'
)8

· Quoted in Koop,

.212..~-'='it.

, p, 1.6J.
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Churchill a year later he said that "•

, that delightful

god , , . the freedom of the Press , . , ," did not always
. h appy. 59
rna l{e h J.m

"

..

• menaced by

He told Churchill he felt he was being

..

, so-called interpretive comment by a

handful or two of gentlemen who cannot get politics out of
their heads in the worst crisis, who have little background
and lcsG lmowledge, and who undertake to lead public opinion
-o-n- tha-t--- bas-i-s--e-''--- -T-he--- President was understandably concE!rnod

with the war and the ever-changeable world situation, and he
complained that "My own press -·- the worst of it -- are
persistently magnifying relatively unimportant domestic
matters • • • • " 60
Perhaps Roosevelt' 13 senUmen t:s were best expressed
early in

1911.;~

v1han an adm.inistration--backed "Wsx Secrets Bill"

was presented to Congress,

1'he bill was prepared in the

Department of Justice and introduced by Democratic Representative Hatton w. Summers of Texas. 61 The proposed bill would
have made it a criminal offense to ". • • communicate,
divulge or publish to any person, in whole or in }Jart, copies
of the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
any file, instrurnent, letter, memorandum, book, pamphlet,

59 Quoted in "Winston S, Chu:r.·chill, ~~he Socond World
war, VoL IV, 'J:he H~ of Fa to (Boston: Ho.ugi1t-ori!vi:LYITii1~
19.')0), P• 200.------

60 Ib.1.d.
.
61
Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971; see also
David Hinshaw, The. Home Front (New York: G, P. 11 utnam' s Sons,
194 J) ' p • 1 J 3 ' ··------·---···---

70
paper, docnment, manuscript, map, picture, plan, record or
other writing

.

," declared secret or confidential by any
department·of the government. 62
~rhe

'

attempt by the administration, through Attorney

General Francis Biddle, to push through this bill elicited
immediate and heated protest from the press.

The War Secrets

Bill was felt by many to be an effort to suppress any infor- - ----mation that--any---government official considered confidential.

A war measure aimed at spies, the bill was, nevertheless, in
permanent fol.'rrl,

Hatton Summers, then Chairman oi' the House

Judiciary Committee said, when he introduced the bill,
I want to protect essential secrets
from being· disclosed to the enemy,
but I W[o\lTI; also to protect the people
of ·chis democracy in the opportunity
to k:rww tli8 things they. ought to know
in order to govern it.15J

Some felt the administration was trying to shift to compulsory and unlimited (either in scope or time) censorship.
news magazine cautioned that the bill would protect the
mi.l:i tar;v· .from civilian advice 1 supervision, and critic ism.
nr_r•:his is censorship at the source," said the article.

"It

means that part of the truth is withheld." 64

One paper
called the proposed bill "Gestapo legislation • ., 6 5 Another
62

"Gag Bill,"

Ti!~•

March 2, 1942, pp. J8-.J9.

6 3Quoted in Hinshaw, op. cit.
64
"1'hreat to Freedom of Press?" .Q_ni·t~_i_§.!~~~J:!~_ws 1
ll'larch 6, 1942, pp. 1)-14. .
6 5"0fficia1 Secrets Bill: Widespread Press
Oprosi'tion," Q_n1:t.~.!.L.§_tate~_NE':J!:?.• l\'larch 6, 19Lf2, p. 21.

One

71
said the bill "

, • would give every burE?au and bureaucrat

in Washington blanket authority to conceal from the public
any bit of' information it or he deemed it inexpedient for the
public to have."

"It would permit the Executive Department
to suppress public controversy about its a.cts, " 66 Attorney

General Biddle sought a formal opinion from Byron Price.

'l'he

Director of the Office of' Censorship replied that he did not
------.---------J:lke- the wording---- of- -t-he-

partly at publication,

bill~

which p he felt t was aimed

He felt the bill amounted to compul-

.
.
67
sory censorshlp
and an en d ..... o vo 1 untary censors !u.p.

Price

passage of the bill in its present
.
t·." 68 The Director
. t he na t.1ona 1 J.nteres
f orm wou 1 d no·
t b e J.n

'wrote Biddle that "

of Censorship rmwt have let his sentiments be known because
Time report-od_ ·th.::tt Price

II

e

to his credit • • • liked the

bill as little af; anybody," 69
After scathing criticism by the press the .A.dministration disavowed its support --· even its !mow ledge. -- of the
bilL 70

The "Official Secrets Bill," or "War Secrets Bill,"

as it was variously called, "
peacefully in committee ... 7 1

, , was allowed to die

66 rbid,
6

7Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971.
68 Ibid.

69 "Gag Blll,"
.
Tim'!)_, March 2, 191+2, p. 38.
70"0f'ficia.l Secrets Bill: Widespread Prero;~;
Opposition;" _llni!~!L_States__li__~~;~• !Viarch 6, 1942, p. 2L
'11Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971.
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J>iml..i~m~IJ.istra ti ve

censorshiP.•

If the

. 72
Adm:i.nif;tration could not legislate compulsory censorshlp,
it could suppress criticism and unpopular opinions by other
legal mean.s.

Byron Price, in his capacity as Director of the

Office of Censorship, stated that his office would not
attempt to censor the government.73

I

Under the concept of

"appropriate authority" any government official could release

l_ ____ --information without first consulting the Office of CensorE;hip,
This concept of "appropriate authority" also applied to
members of Congress.

Congressmen and Senators, when speaking

on the floor of either chamber, were immune from censorBhip
regulations and their remarks were printed regularly in the
.CO~"!;e;res§_i~S1:.1.

Rec,_ci_}'d.

The solons did not always limit their

remarks to the floor of CongreBs, however.

In fact, they

spoke so freely, and in what many felt to be in violation of
censorship regulations, that they became knovm as the "531
holes in Byron's Code •• 74
Although the Office of Censorship did not pro:pose to
censor the government, the.government intended to censor
itself.

Before the war many Federal agencies provided

printGd .information as a service to any and all who requested
that in;format.ion.

In ,J1me,

19~'2,

Pred.dent Roosevelt issued

72 It should be remembered that tJ-w Office of
Censorship did not have the power of legislation, but
functioned by Executive Order.
7J&:P_C?.JZLon t[l~_Q_ffic~ of_g_~nsoy_Eh1.p, p. 32.
74t\obcert Humphreys, "How Your News is Censored,"
_!2.§-tUE_clay Ev~~l_"l__i_I2fLE_ost, Septembf.'r 26, 1942, p. 114.

7J
~m

Executive Order that authoriz,ed the Office of War Infor-

mation75 ", , , to require the curtailment or elimination of
any Federal information service, program, or release •• ,
not directly related to the prosecution of the war eff'ort ... 7

6

By October of 1942 the Office of War Information had withdravm from or drastically reduced the circulation of more
:r·epresented
Elmer Davis,
then Director of the Office of War Information, said that his
office did not want to censor any government official.

But

the wording of Davis's statement certainly gives some
indication of how the Administration felt about federal
officials talking tti reporters:
If some official disagrees with a
policy that has been a.greed on and
adoiYtt'ld, there is nothing to prevent him from expressing such disagreement to reporters -·- nothing
e~ce~~ his ~udgment and sense of
pxopr.J.ety. 7
~:here

was ". • , no law reg.ui.ring compliance with the

requests of the Office of Censorship, and there [was] no

75Established by Executive Order 9182 on June 1J,
19IJ·2, the Office of War Information consolidated and
replaced the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of
Government Reports, the Coordinator of Information, and the
Division of the Emergency Managemc;nt Office (7FR4468-69).
'7 6Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and
fell!?_?!:si:.tr.. · (Wa9hi.ngton, D. C • : American-·c 6uncflon-P-ubh cAffa1rs, L194J]), p. 17.

'17 Il:JJ:.0. • • P • 25 •
?8Ibj~~l· , p. 21+.

penalty for violations • • •

.. 79

However, when an editor or

broadcaster refused to heed the requests of the Office of
Censorship, that editor or broadcaster might receive a letter
from the Office of Censorship calling attention to his
"error."

A flagrant violation of censorship regulations or

requests might elicit a public statement from the Office of
Censorship naming the radio station or newspaper in violation.
------------..ltn- edi-tor--- or-- broadcaster .who persisted in violating voluntary

censorship guidelines could be prosecuted under the Espionage
Act of 1917 or the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1918.
The Federal Gove:cnrnent could rely on various ways
for punishing editors who disregarded the requests of the
voluntary codes.

·washington correspondents might have the:tr

welcome withdrawn at official press conferences, or receive
a cold shoulder when they sought 6fficial information.
Government agend.es could "neglect" to send press releases to
certain publicati.ons, or even 'resort to public condemnation
of a paper defying the code.

Wide publicity of such public

condemnation would not set well with competitors, advertisers,
Or

8
~
re. ad.e~s,

°

F'. lna
· J_J-Y, ·c'l1ere was one o·;,1er
l,_
th
·
· rea t enJ.ng

aspect always held in abeyaneroJ ··- compulsory censorsh.ip if
voluntary censorship proved ineffective •81

p. 2.

80

zechariah Chafee, Jr., Govermnent and lViass
Vol. I (Chicago: UnTve1-\slty a·rciiiCago
Press, 191+7J.p, lf59·
·
goi]!Jl'.!!l2~l_C'0\~}ons,

8 1-Lb' d

.:.....1:._ • • p •

+60 •

J

75
'rhe government could also use its ovm departments to
punish those who opposed administration policies.

The most

favored method was to instruct the Post Office Department to
suspend the mailing privileges of uncooperative publica.tions.
In regards to radio stations, ", . • the Federal Communications Commission had the power of license . , , .,82 John
Fetzer, formerly Chief Radio Censor in the Office of Censors-n-ip~

--st_ated-- that-he did

n.

was removed from the air

8

..

not recall that any station

•

'

.,83

Byron Price, however,

admitted that a "cov.ple of broadcasters" were removed from
. f or
th e aJ_r

I

n ~

•

,

.
.
open1 y sprea d ~ng
sub vers1on
, , . . " 84

Keep re1iorted that in two cases Price contacted radio station
managers and requested that certain foreign-language broad-·
casters, one Gen.nan and one Italian, be removed from the air
fo:c questionable activities; the request was complied with. 8 5
A.~9.~.§0Cl_~L..;jJAstJc.2..

The government was most

active when silencing critical newspapers or writers.

One

free--lance writer was convicted of violating the Espionage
Act of 191'7 for his written attacks on President Roosevelt,
the English, and the Jews, and for advocating a German
victory in World War II. 86

There were a m1mber of sim.i.lar

82 Byron Price to writer,
November 8, 1971.

8 3J·ohn Fetzer to writer, November 18,
1971..
84 Byron Price to writer, November 8,
1971.
8

5Koop, E:e..: cit., p. 181·!·,

86chafee, 2l2_:_ci t. , pp. 4 50-451.

cases. 8 7

Very early in the war the Post Office delayed an

entire issue of the Townsend
. 1 • 88
.
t e d"t
an t ~-governmen
~ or~a

Nat~onal

..weekly because of an

The most"notable instance of official suppression of
editorial opinion occurred in early 191-1-2 when the Federal
Government, through the Post Office and J'ustice Departments,
Sodal

·---~-·

Jus~!ge,

a -weekly -newspaper,

first s.ppeared on March 1J,

It was utilized by Father Charles Coughlin, the "radio
priest," for his anti--government campaigns.

Severely anti-

Roosevelt, §..££.~~cT~_!ice, in its October 21, 19/t-0 iBsue,
advocated the impeachment of the President because of hif;

l

transfer of military aircraft to Great Britain, and becmwe
of' his friendshiy toward RU:ssia. 89 Coughlin, an Irish
Catholic priest, had little love for the British, and accused
Roosevelt of" . • • loving Great Britain more than the United
States. ,.90
In March of 1941 the Army banned Soc_:i,_:?.LJ.:~w!l£:£ from
its military posts.
for its action.

The Army offered no official explanation

S<!,.cia,l..l_usti~,

in its Anglophobic and anti-·

Semitic wrath, responded by saying Americans were becomine;

-----·---·

87].:bJ__(L, P• 450, n. 15.
88E'd. t . J .
". tor and PublJ.sher,"
'
l: .. orl.a. _ l.n "Eu~
J.anuary 2 1¥,
194 2 • p. 26, reprinted in Summers, _2~cic!•• p. 164 •

8
. . 9charles J, .Tu~l •. !~a,th~F_Cough}-~~a,r:~<,t_i_:)1e New__QE;a~
(New Y.ork: Syracuse Um.vers1.tyPress, .965), p.-22).
9°Quoted in ibid., p. 226.
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" • • • a mesmerized people -- mesmerized by British gold and
Jewish propaganda ... 9 1
Social Justi_ce characterized Roosevelt as a radical,
a crack .. pot, and an un-American dictator.

The anti-Semi tic

nature of Social Justice was certainly not disguised.

I

I__

In

September of 1.94-1 the paper showed its racial hatred when :L t
commented on whs.t it felt to be the ls.rge number of pro .. war
Jews in the Rc)osevel i Administration:
The Jew should retire from the field
of politics and government. He has
no more business in that sphere than
has a pig in a china shop.'12
Social Justice blamed Roosevelt for the Pearl Harbor attack
even more than it ·blamed ,Jap8.n 1 and in March of 191+2 the

pa}'·~l~ accused th'J ,Tev.rs of starting World War II, 93

irritation.

He often sent samples of the paper to Attorney

General Francis Biddle with comments like, "What are you
doing to stop this?"9 4

In April of 194·2 Biddle, at the

urging of the President, began the crack-dova1 on Social
Justic.::,

Biddle fir·st directed Postmaster General Frank

Walker to "suspend or revoke" the second-class mailing privileges of the paper under the authority of the Espionage Act
of' 191?.

'l'h~)

Attorney general then sent an emissary to

91 Quoted in ibid,, p. 228.
92 Ib~d. , p. 229.
93r·b·. 1
.:..-..2:£. ~

f

PP• 230-233·

9 4 Quoted in

i:PJ.d.,

p. 23~.
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Archbishop Mooney of Detroit, who ordered F'ather Coughlin to
divorce himself from all relationship to

.~ocial

Justice, and

to ", , , cease all public pronouncements for the duration of
the war under penalty of defrockment."

F'ather Coughlin

complied completely, choosing the priesthood over a secular
career,95

i ties from continuing the crack-dovn.1. unti1 .§_ociJ\ct..;c1.2'.f::lt~~!.:l.. •
its mailing privileges revoked, its public sale and distribution denied, and its owners threatened with prosecution for
sedition, folded'· never to be printed again, 97

Three other

publications were,. subsequently denied mailing privileges for
cri tid. zing the administr-ation, aligning themselves with Axis
opinion, criticizing Great Britain, creating racial hatred,
or reprinting articles from Social Justic!.9 8
According to New Regub}.).c, 'by October of 1942 nearly
forty magazines had their mailing privileges revoked by the
Post Office Department.99

One New York newspaper which con-

tained racing information (which the government felt could be

9 5rb • '

.:!:_•.:~9: "

' pp. 234·-235 •

9 6Ibiq., p. 2J6.
97 Chafec , .S!.l'c..!.....EL~. , p. J20.
98
News stor~v ill "Editor and Publisher," May 9, 1942,
p. 6, reprinted in Summers, ~cit., pp. 165-166. These
three publica t:Lons wen' the (Philadelphia) Herold, the
(Mi.mc:i.e) ~-·P:_<'::i• and the (Wichita) J::~blici t~-.-·- 99chafec, 912..:._...2-Ll·
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an open code) was taken off the streets on the advice of the
Office of Censorship.
No evidence is yet available that would indicate the
total number of publications that were suppressed by the
government during the war.

The reference above says thel"fJ

were forty such incidents before the war was a year olcL
Byron Price said he would not have thought there had beer<

j----- -th8:t many •
-

,

-~- _1_f\()

~

v v

Prol)ably the majority of these suppressirxr1<J

was handled by the Post Office Department under its regu-·
lations against the mailing of seditious materiaL

"In some
cases Censorship was consulted, in others it was not," 101
Byron Price said that the Office of Censorship ". . • never
interfered in any manner with editorial opinion and it was a
cardinal policy never to take notice of criticism of the
government," 102
The _Mo:J,_oto.:.:___gto:sY,.

As explained above, one of the

ways in which the Office of Censorship could· punish a paper
for non-compliance with censorship requests was to publicly
identify and criti.cize.that paper for its disobedience.
In late !Viay of 191+2 the Office of Censorship was
informed that Russian l<oreign Commisf>ar V. M. Molotov would
soon visit the United States.

The State Depal"tment wanted to

insure that there would be no advance reporting of this
100

101
102

Byron Price to writer, December 20, l971.
Ibid.
Byron Price to writer, November B, 1971.
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diplomatic visit.

The Office of Censorship assured "the State

Department that the censorship codes requested that editors
and broadcasters withhold news of any diplomatic mission
illltil specific pennission to publish such information was
. 103
received from appropriate authority.

The Office of Censorship notified editors and broadcasters that a "Russian Diplomat" would v:tsit the United
- - - - ------ -

-------- --

-- ----- --- --- - - -

States very soon, -and they were to refl"ain from mentioning
.
.
. . ' 104
t] l~s upcom1ng v1s1o.
All radio stations and new:c;papers

complied with this request-- except one. During Molotov's
visit to the United States 10 5 the Philade:J.:£b.t§l_Q<3.i£L New~.
. a c h a tt
printed, ", . . li1
··y co ..l umn on page 12 • • • , ,.106 a
single sentcmce which read,
~t'he talk i.n official Russi8.n circles
here is that v. M. Molotov oJ Soviet
Russia is in this country on a seeret
mission of vast importance.107

The revealed item went largely unnoticed and Molotov ended
his "secret" twelve-day visit on June H, 1942.

On June 12

Byron Price released a report of the visit to the radio and
the press.

In this release he congratulated the cooperative

.

·o~

~)Code for Broadcasters (1-15-42), p. 4; see also

£ode .J:2.r'-tl:!£_J~Xe8E ·-n:Ts-IT2!7'P. I+ •
104
Koop, ~!_.S:it.. , p. 220.
llurns,

iO -h,o
"'" ..l o t ov arr1ve
' d a t th e W".
' }! ouse on May 29
.. l·Ge
. ; see
c,:j,_! • ' p • 2 J 2 •
106
Koop, .£E• cit.

~::.r:

__.___

lO? Q.u.otecl in "What Sense Censorship?" 'fJ.mH, June 22,

1942, pp.

58~ . 60;

quotation on p. 60.

.
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media for withholding news of Molotov's visit.

'l'he Phila-

---

del)2hi?- Daily_News was not going to be ignored, however, and
Price concluded his press release with this paragraph:
The one newspaper in which the story
was published was the Philadelphia
Daily News [sic], The publisher of
the Daily.News [sic] has assured us
that the Code was not violated intentionally, but so far he has made no
satisfactory explanation of the
lOS
manner in which the error occurred. ·
By publicly naming the paper that "violated" the code, Price
tried to bring odium upon the

Ph~,,lad~!.1!l:!iaJ2.ai1~::_l:!ey!E;

as

punishment,
But this publisher's "error" had not received national
coverage and, as it turned out, the Office of Censorship had
little cause to ·worry about 'the indiscretion of the paper,
At the same time that Molotov was visiting tho White House
the Duke and Duchess of Windsor dropped in for a visit with
the President.

Time magazine reported that",

• while

photographers waited at the Vlhi te Iiouse to catch the Duke and
Duche,:;s, . • • Molotov strolled slowly past them and not a
camera clicked ... l09

This Time article went further and criti-

cized the press blackout of the Molotov visit.
was, said

~t~l.E".•

The blackout

made a't the request of the Russian Government

in order to keep secret from the American people the fact an
agreement brctween the Uo S, and the U. S. S. R, was pending o

108

.

_9eJ~<_£_()..£St£l-!._j'r_~s§.

p. 60.

Re le§l.£~..1:!.£L...31• June 12, l91i-2.

l09"VIhat Sense Censorshii;'t" 21-1!1!:.• June 22, 191+2,
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This, said Time, ". , , was a case of political, not military,
censorship. " 110 1'ime thus dulled the edge of Censorship's
blade in this battle of the war on words.
Reinforcements:
----

The Revised Codes

On June 15, 1942 the voluntary censorship codes for
th e press an d

.

racl~o

were

!___ --editions .were .expanded

.

rev~se

d. ancl

.

re~ssue

d , ll.l

These new

and revised to meet the needs of· cen-

sorship that had arisen since the first codes had been issued
in January.

Most sections of the new codes were strengthened

or made more restrictivet
In the Code for Broadcasters the restrictions on
-----------------·-~-

we2,ther data were made almost all-inclusive,

Radio stations

were requested teo keep off the air "all weather data, eith0r
forecasts, sununarhls, recapi tulatior,s, or any details of
weather conditions," 112 'rhe only exceptions involved emergency aru10uncements, such as floods, but even these emergency announcements could", , • contain no reference to
weather conditions,"ll3

Byron Price, an-ticipating evasion of

1iOibid.
111u, S, Office of Censor,~hip, Code of Wartime
Prac-tices for American Broadcasters, E·oTl:To:n of'~Jurie~-15, 1942
T\Va-shlngton--;J:J:cr:·:-u.-s. Governrneiil Printing Off ice) , 1942 ~
hereafter refel:red to as Code for Broadcasters ( 6--15-4-2); see
also u. s. Office of censo1·shrr;·; Coctc?o1.,w~i:rtl.me Practices
for the American Press, Edition o:C:Jun-e-T_5':··-197-fTl1Tash.fngton,
D.c-:-:- u. s·:- Gov'm'11n1e!1t Printing Office), l9i+2j hereaHer
n>fon·ed to as _Qod~ fo~ the -~~!?.:!2.5. ( 6-15-.h2).
112
Co9:.§':.. ..!.?I Broacl.caste~_§_ ( 6--15-42), p. 2.
l13Il)J.Cot~~
..,
p. J.
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these rules, said that these weather restrictions also
applied tq the "wisecracldng announcer" who says, on a rainy
morning, "Where is that record 'Get Out Your Old Umbrella."'
This revelation, according to Price, constituted a "dangerous
disclosure." 114
Other sections covering troops, ships, fortifications,
industrial production, communications, and unconfirmed

1----- -reports

or rumors-were restated and clarified.

This new

edition of the radio code included a newly expanded section

I
I

covering restrictions on radio coverage of air attacks on the
United States. 11 5 Before an air raid began broadcasters (and
publishers) were asked to give no warning of' the impending
raid unltesB author:\.zed by the Army Defense Command,

After a

raid began broadcasters (and publishers) wen' asked to give
no information beyond the bare fact that a raid had brJgun
and that local defense forces had .gone into action.

After a

raid was over broadcasters (and publishers) could release
stories about the raid if they did not include
(1)

horror or sensationalism,

(2)

unconfirmed versions or reports,

(3)

any estimate of the number of planes
involved or the number of bombs dropped,

( 4)

p. 2.

reference to damage,

( 5)

information as to the exact routes
taken by enemy planes, or

( 6)

counter-measures of defense. 116

The caveat concludes that "Nothing in this request is
intended to prevent· or curtail constructive reporting • . •
of such matters as feats of heroism, incidents of personal
courage, or response to duty by the military or cd.vilia:n
- - - - - - - - - ----- - - - - - - - - - __11 ''defense workers,"~~'

Any ·reporter trying to describe an a:Lr

attack under these restrictions would be putting his journalistic ability to the acid test.

Broadcasters were to give

no information, even after an attack, concerning damage, the
area attacked, or the number of planes involved.

One editor

asked if the enerrly would not lmow how many planes it had
sent! 118

Concerning the restriction against describing the

rout('S of planes in the attack, Price suggested that something similar to "over the Los Angeles area" be used.. 119 All
radio stations in the area of the attack would "• •• operate
or not operate at the direction of the Army Defcmse
Comman d.• "120 .Apparently the .Army would ])8 in the best
position to determine wha.t information would or would not aid
the enemy in the event of an air attack,

.According to Byron

116.(b'
.
. -J.d.

11'1-[b'd
. l
•
118
Koop, 2E-·-~~t., p. 198.
11 9c
...ensors h'
!2:1?. P ress Re 1 ease No. 8, February 25, 1942 .
P•

J.
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Price, "It could even be argued with force that the broadcasting of time signals might give information to the enemy.
All his clocks and watches might have stopped!" 121
Balloons and bombs.

'l'he air attacks provided for in

this edition of the codes never came,

But there were

attacl~:s

on the continental United States, both by sea and by air.
The first of these attacks came on February 22, 1942, when a
Japanese submarine surfaced off the coast of Santa Barbara,
California, and shelled a ranch, with no casualties and
little damage, 122
In late 19Lfl+ t.he Japanese began launching bombcarrying paper balloons towards the United States.

These

balloons, about thirty feet in diameter and carrying a thirty
pc>v.nd explord.ve dE)Vice, were launched from Japan to ride on
natural air currents to the United States where the changes
in air temperature and current over land would allow the
-balloons, with their small bombs attached, to descend.

'I he

first of these floating bombs was found at San Pedro, California on November 11, 1944. 12 3 Other bomb-laden balloons
were found in Montana, Cana.da, Wyoming, Ws.shington, Oregon,

121

Q<o'11:'.3_9.rsh~i..E...J're ~§__Re ::l.e ?~e

N~_1 B, l\'lay 11, 191+2.

122B
. urns, .£P. Cl't·. , p. 21~
. ..J, Koop says the date was
February 23, and that the shells hit a.n oil field; see Koop,
~cit., p. 196.
12

3Koop, .O..B.:_ci:t_., pp. 198-199; seE:: also Richard R.
Llngeman, Don't You Know 1'here 's A War On? 'l'he American Home
.

Front, 194T.:T91J: 5 (New ·rai:k:
)!+- )_,....----·------

·c.r:-- P. -Fulnam
•;,--r:>ons-;--I9';~crr-, P-IJ:·--.
.
J '
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an d as f .ar E' as t as M'1c h'1gan. 124

In each d.iscovery the govern-

ment, either through the F. B. I., the Office of Censorship,
or through military authorities, tried to suppress news of
these balloon-bomb landings.

Some newspapers serving areas

where balloon-bombs were discovered, however, were able to
print some short-lived stories of the bombs, which caused
some shol't-li ved excitement.
--na.te-d

th~e-war-Department

Byron Price subsequently desig-

as appropriate authority for the

release of information of' these "enemy attacks,"

The Office

of Censorship requested that editors and publishers not aid
the enemy by printing news stories about the balloons.
On May .5, 1945, a group of Sw1day School children on a
church picnic in Oregon found a "white object" on the ground,
One of the child.J:·en picked up the object and it exploded.
Five ·childnen and one adult woman were Jdlled.

'rhe "white

object" turned out to be one of the bombs carried by a
Japanese balloon,

The news of these deaths, the only ones

ever reported resulting from these bomb-laden balloons,
spread rapidly among Oregonians.

The press clamored for

permission to release the story.

A

consultation between

Censorship and military authorities detco:rmined that release
of the s'to:cy would cause panic in the United States, and g:i.ve
aid and information to Japan, possiblybringing more balloons.
The media were di.rectc<d to withhold all reference to bombs,
balloons, Japan, or military interest in the Oregon d"aths,
124

.

.

At least one of these balloons may have drifted as
far East as Maryland; see Lingeman, .2Jl....!.......9_i t .• , p. 9>,
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which were then reported as caused by an "· • , explosion
from an undetermined cause • • • ,125
However, Oregon officials and others warned that
school children would soon be going into the woods as summer
was rapidly approaching.
these children.

Something had to be done to protect

The Army decided that it woudl begin an

educational campaign in the schools West of the Mississippi.
- - - - --

- - --------- ---- --

------

--

---

-

Very soon primary school children were admonished not to go
near any unusual objects in the woods or on the beaches, and
not to touch any white or brightly colored. "balloons" they
might find.
panic.

This program created much confusion and some

Many parents wanted to know what their children were

being warned about.

And the newspavers wanted to know why

thGy eould not print information that thirty million school
children were in possession of.

As a result of this con-

fusion, the press and radio were allowed to print or broadcast information concerning the balloons from Japan as long
as they withheld strategic information concerning injuries,
location of explosions, and frequency of balloon landings. 126
With the end of the war the radio and press were
allowed to offer detailed stories about the Japanese balloonbombs.

Military authoritiGn tried, unsuccessfully, to continue the newr; blackout on the balloons. 12 'l But they could

lZ'lK
.. oop,

' t , p. ·.201. ,
EJ2.:._£L__,

126 '"b'd
L ..±.,.; • ' P , 200 •
12 7_I.bic!;., pp, zoJ .. ;w4 •.
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not show that this information was still dangerous.

Intelli-

gence information obtained after the war revealed that the
Japanese .launched approximately ten thousand of these bombladen balloons at a cost of more than

~;1,

000,000.

Fewer than

ten percent of the balloons· launched landed on the United
States. 128 Byron Price, to his credit, was able to mediate
the justifiable desires of broadcasters and publishers with
---- --- -tne-- (--s-oruetinle-fr)-- -jv.stii'iable demands of the_;I.' he

diploma tic:____:£laC'~kout.

Army~

-

The code revisions of

June 15, 191+2, carried a new restriction on the "Premature
disclosure of diplomatic negotiations or conversations." 12 9
~:his

single.-sentGn.ce. revision of the codes brought widespread

and immediate criticism from the press.

When these com-

plaints were raised the press code was amended to apply
". , • only to exchanges relating to the war ,

. . ."130

But even with t)1is amendment many felt that censorship of
diplomatic negotiations could be utilized to cover an almost
unlimited field.

Political censorship was not going to be

taken lightly by the American press.

The Federal Government

retained sole authority in deciding which diplomatic
exchanges were "war related."

!:i.ew

H.e~bli()_

reported that the

State Department ))ad induced the Office of Censorship to
--~~""-··------·-~

128
.
rbid. , p. 204; see also Knight, E12. cit. , p. 83.
Cost supplled-by Byron Price to writer, DeceiiiJier;->20, 1971.
12
9.9_9-§.e for Broadc8~~§. ( 6-15--42), p. 6, and Code

f9r_ Htg__P1-:_es:2_ (b-15-42), p. b.
1 'oO
~

·

Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.
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1 1
forbid public discussion of pending diplomatic relations. 3
Diplomatic negotiations and themovements of the
President of the United States were necessarily related.
Roosevelt and many other government officials requested that
news of their travels be withheld by the press and radio.

In

January of 191<-J President Roosevelt· prepared to travel to
Casablanca for his now famous meeting with Winston Churchill.
Many members of the press and radio knew of this impending
visit but complied with requests from the Office of Censorship that this news be withheld until officially released by
appropriate authority,
NewB of t!Je President's domestic travelf.l was also
blacked out until F.dter they had ocenrred.
approvt~d

of thl.s practice, however.

Not all ed.i tors

It was an odd si tnation

for thousands of persons to see the President in their city
and still deprive the local papers the right to mention it at
all until they received permission,

Even when the press

cooperated, its representatives became angry when censorship
regulations denied them the right to print a story in which
they saw no danger.

A situation like that occurred during

RoomlVel t' s trip to Ca:i.ro in November of' 1943,

While the

President was still hi Cairo, the German radio network
announced not only that he was there, but also that he would
soon leave for Iran and a meeting with Stalin,

---------131

.

.

.

. "Bureaucrat:tc Censorsh:tp,"
October 26, 1942, pp. 531-532.
132
- 1'.,.oop, .S'.P..:__.c.2:."t
..:. , p. 222
. •

Ame.rican pub.

Ne~__ll.E'J?.!:!bl-'~2.·
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lishers immediately requested permission to publish this news
on November )0, a few hours before the Office of Censorship
planned to release the information, and a few minutes after
Germany already had.

1'he Office of Censorship and the White

House refused to release the information and American pub-

the enemy!
Election year, 194-4, proved to be particularly difficult for the Office of Censorship and for the American press.
The President's po,litical spealdng trips received prior cen-·
sorship,

When DeJaocratic workers in Chicago began distri-

buting tickets to a speech by the Pn,sident in that city,
local Chicago

paJ)Ol~s

requested permission to publish what

everyone knew-- that the President would make a speech in·
Chieago.
partly.

~rhe

Office of Censorship grudgingly relented --

The papers were told they could say that it was

"hoped" the President would speakin Chicago on a particular
1 JLf

day!·-

On January 19, 191>5, just one day before Eoosevelt's

fourth inauguration, the Of'fice of Censorship tightened its
restriet:i.ons on the publication of news about the Chief
Executive's future meetings with Allied leaders.

Broad-

casters and editors were requested " •• , not to publish or

91
broadcast any· information or guesses • •

" concerning these

future meetings. 1J5
Some members of the American press felt they were
being scooped by European newspapers.

While the loyal

American press felt compelled to comply with censorship
requests to suppress news of the President's whereabouts, the
European press acted under no such restraints.

Journalist
.

.

.

---.--wes-tbrooR-Fegie_r_,-a-ngere-dby the restrictions and the European scoops, announced that he would definitely publish
advance information of the President's next domestic trip,
", •• in defiance of the censorship which has no legal
support." 1 36 Byron Price went immediately to Pegler's
employer, King Features, and cautioned -- or warned -·· that
widespn,Hd dC'>flw:,ce of voluntary censorship requests would
inevitably lead. to compulsory censorship.

Pegler failed to

report on the President's future domestic travels. 1 37
1'he State Department, although it denied such al.legations, continued its manipulation of diplomatic news until
the end of the war.

Correspondent's stories dealing with

diplomatic negotiations or with countries involved in diplo ..
matic negotiations with the United States were carefully read
by the State department.

One war correspondont complained

that ". . • despite [Secretary of State HuH's] protestations

lJ5-·t
l J..i d •
lJ6J.b'
d•
_:. __!:_._

p

pp. 231-2J2.

1J7J'b'
d
_:,_2;__

•

p. 2J2.

0
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that his department imposed no political censorship, it has
• • • specifically requested the Pentagon people to deliver

up to it any dispatches by returning war correspondents
which dealt with China • .,1.JS
On April 5, 1945 Russia demounceO. its non-aggressim1
pact. with ,Tapan.

Many editors felt the E. us sian action was a

prelude to a declaration of war on Japan by the Soviet Union.
-------Many-- be--l-ieved- -this--. --but few could say so

the Office of Censorship ordered a ban on discussion of the
subject in the American press.

While the European press was

allowed to export its newspapers ·to the United States with
editorials speculating on the Russo-Japanese situation,
American editors \vere prohibited even the right to reprint
thes~'

imported editorials,

'J:herei'ore, if one was to read

the London J.inic_s: in Wasrdngton he would learn of the diplomatic speculation, if he read the Washin_e.:.t.s>!l_Post in London,
he would not,

'l:he

~shir1._~ton_Post

editorialized:

Well, as we werE! saying, !VIr. l'rice, the
Far Eastern situatioh is fraught with
interest and, uh • • . eh • , • pregnant
with possibilities and, so far as the
home front is concerned, its the very
devil of a job to publish a newspaper_
in the face o:f censorship inanit:Les,l39
Byron Price said that speculation by the American press on
the Russo.-,Japanese situation ". • • could possibly lead to a
1"8].
. Sevarel. d ,
-' ,;r.l.c
"Censorship in the Saddle," Nation,

April 14, 19Li·5, p, Lf16.
1JO
.
·
'Quoted J.n "Well Uh, Mr. Price,"
April 16, 1945, pp. 84-85.

.!:!.~~'?!'.~~!·

9}
Japanese attack on Soviet Russia [and the].sacrifice of
American lives •

• •

,140

~'he

Office of Censorship was

obviously acting under instructions from the State Department.
Most persons could guess that when Germany was beaten Russia
would then declare war on Japan.

L

But what many persons did

not know was that the United States, Great Britain, and
Russia would meet soon in Germany • 141

-- --

-

-

--

-

--

-

'rhe Office of Censor-

----

ship banon speculation, at the behest of the Department of
State, was issued in an effort to protect against premature
disclosure of this meeting.
Just before the Allied invasion of Europe the Office
of Censorship assumed a different position in regards to
speculation by the press.

~!he

rationale in this case was

that nr3ither the people nor the press knew the exact place or
time of the invasion, but everyone, including Germany, knew
an invasion was forthcoming.

A ban on invasion speculation

could have been a dangerous strategy.

A virtual blackout of

speculation might have enabled Germany to more accurately
predict the invasion date. 142
So the diplomatic blackout, which included news of
the President's travels, was, according .to the Office of
Censorship and the State Department, designed to protect the
Allied war effort.

ll.fO

141

It also,.if not be desi.gn, then by

Quoted in ib.id,
The Potsdam Conference,

142K

oop,

~·

. ,_

c1~.,

,

pp. 23 6 -237·

circumstance, deprived the American people of important news
of the Allied war effort, the release of which many editors
felt would not have hindered that effort.

On February 1, 1943 the voluntary codes for the press
and radio were revised and reissued for the second time.
--------Each of _these new_ codes carried a "Special Note" to editors_
and broadcasters which stated:
You are reminded that whenever anyone
else, in any part of the country, makes
a request which appears unreasonable or
out of harmony with the Code, you are at
liberty to appeal at once to the Office
of Censorship. Much confusion would be
avoided if such appeals were ;nore frequent.

i~-3

'rhis note was apparently included because of the efforts of
military censors, which often conflicted with policies and
decisions of the Office of Censon;hj;p.

An important addition

to these codes was directly related to the conflict between
journalists and military censors.

A journalist would, in

return for permission to tour militarily restricted areas,
agree, in writing, to submit his material to military censors
before publication.

The codes cautioned that in these cases

143u. S, Office o:F. Censorship, Code of Wartime Prac-·
tices for American Broadcasters, Edi ti.on of February!-, 1943
"["washirigtori~f:-cr::--u-:-s-:-liwei:Y:iment Printing Office, 194J);
"Special Note" carried on unnumbered page preceding page 1
(hereafter referred to as Code for Broadcasters (2-1-43);
see also u s, Office of censorsh:i:P7-Cod""ii··-·orTtfartime Practices :for the American Press, Edition-o:(··l:'ebruaryT;·-f92+3
(WasT1'lngton-~--l5;·c;-:-o~-. Government Printing Office, 1943);
"Spec.·ial. Hote" on :p. ii (hereafter referred to as Code for
the PJ.:£5?.§ ( 2--J .. I~J)),
-----·
o

9.5
where journalists had made a written agreement with mi;Litary
authorities, those military authorities retained censorship
control from which there could be no appeal to the Office of
11<-4
Censorshlp.
0

Byron Price, guided by the principles of voluntary
censorship rather than military desires, adopted

a

British

tenet of censorship that said, "What does not concern the war
- -- ------------ - --- ----- - - "14 c:·
does not concern Censorship," :; But military authorities
acted as though an;y-thing that happened in a country at war
necessarily concerned the war and was therefore subject to
military censorship.

The Office of Censorship often had to

compromise its principles in the face of government-supported
military censorship.

At one time tht' Office of Censorship,

ay,pa!'Emtly acting at the request of military authorities

working through tl1e administration, required that all stories
about Alaska destined for publication in the United States
had to first be cleared by its office.

The government

required prior submission of all news stories from Alaska
because of Japanese military activity in the Aleutian Islands.
TimEC took the Office of Censorship and the government to task
for thiFi blanket censorship,

1'he magazine pointed out that

the "blue-penciling" of such stories, rather than depriving
the enemy of information (the Japanese apparently lrnew where
they were), successfully Jwpt important news out of print in

.
11+6
the Um.ted States.
~Phis

was not the only time t.he government was charged

with holding back information on the grounds it would help
the enemy when in reality it did so to keep information from
the American public,

J·ournalist Arthur

Krocl~

was sharply

critical of military authorities who, with government consent,
withheld the news that
------- ----by ---t-he

-~Ja}/anc

u. s.

forces were blockaded on Bataan

sc -1-- ---He --said

the- J·apanese

knew of the blockade, but the American people did not,
because the press was not a.llowed to tell them. 1Li·?

In a

similar case Tokyo Radio broadcast that the JapanGse had
captured four flye_rs from General Doolittle's raiders, but
the Ur1.ited Statep, GovGrnment waited six months before
'rhe United States Governrnent • s delay in

thi~t

instance succeeded only in keeping the

information from the American people.
In 19LfJ the U, S. Navy impounded the manuscripts and
proofs of four new books on the submarine service.

The books,

which had been cleared by the Office of Censorship, were
designed. to draw men into the short-handed submarine service,
The Navy· decided the boolr.s contained information important to
the enemy, even though the JlUblisher pointed out that the

ll.J-6
pp.

58~-60.

"What Sense Censorship?"

~lJm.<:.,

<Tune 22, 191+2,

11+'7
Arthur Krock, "Why Our Newspapers Can • t Tell the
~~ruth," f~ade£!l_fl.i:£est:, November, 191<·2, pp. '75-'?6.
J.!Hl.,,,,,hat
P n.ce
·
?
,
Secrecy."
:rJ· . JE~· November 9,

pp. 6t--62.

1

'
19'-~'2,
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same information was carried in national daily newspapers
without official objection. 149
Blanket censorship by the government and military
authorities became increasingly bold in 194J.

At the first

important conference of the United Nations held on American
soil,l50 soldiers carrying rifles with fixed bayonets barred
the pret's from the proceedings , 1 51
Bernard DeVoto, a frequent administration critic,
excoriated the governmEmt for withholding and delaying news
of the war.

He charged that ", , . nine months after the

raid on Tokyo 1 5 2 we still have not been told the story.
Valuable information might be given the enemy if we are
.
' "''
told'?"
.L.)_;

'rhe government fe.l t it would deprive the enemy of

va1us:blc .informa·-Lion by \vi thhoJ..ding details of tho air raids.

But there were probably few Japanesco in Tokyo who did not

149

.

"Censorsh~p:

.
.
S1.lenced Serv1.ce,"

.

!.:~,.me,

August 2J,

194-J, pp. 56-5'?.
l501'he U. N. Conference on Food and Agriculture, held
at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 to .June J, 19LfJ; see Richard
B. Morris (ed.), ~-nc;y_<::_lo..eg_Cl,"h'J. ofAl!l_~J:'iCjl,n Hi_~!2.s'L (New York,
Harper & Row Publlshcrs, 19b.5f, p. Joo.
l5l"Is Policy of Suppressing the News Ga.ining Top
Hand in Wa.shington?" J:l_r:_wsweels, February 19, 19~·5, pp. l+O-l.J2,
l5ZG enera.l Doo .1".t·c"tl.e ' s f.
. ral. d on ,.,.1.0 k.yo was on
.:u~s t
a.tr
April Hl, 1942. Miscalculations on fuel. conrc:umption pre·vented some planes from reaching friendly bases in Ch:lna,
causing them to land in .Japanese-held territory; see Charles
Van Doren and others (eds.), Webster's Guide to American
Hist~E? ( SpdngfieJ.d, Massachuseffs-;- G-~-&·--c::·llfeY::riam Company,
Pubhshers, 1971), pp. lJ-87-'+88.
.
l5JBernard DeVoto, '"l'elJ. the people the truth,"
April, 1943, pp. 541-54-4·; quotation on p. 5'+J.

!:!§:E"~.5!•

!mow a bout the raids once they began.

'I' he withholding of

information to avoid aiding the enemy was almost always done
at the expense of the uninformed public.

DeVoto, para-

phrasing the government, said the "American Joe" is told to
", , , sticlc to his job, pay his taxes, buy bonds, and let
the government run the war without int<,rference, criticism,
or even inqui.ry."

He fv.rther argued that ".

an infor-med
"154

_sabotage is secret.

The edition of the codes issued

on February 1, 1943, requested that nothing be said about
sabotage,

Publishers and broadcasters were requested to

refrain from mentioning any efforts at sabotage by enemy
agents.

Even when reporting accidents, they were advised

that" . • , no mention of sabotage should be made except on
• • • appropriate authority

1

e

•

t

"155

'l'his was, according

to TiEJe magazine, the first time in any United States war
that salJotage was classified as a military secret. 1 56 The
news magazine cogently pointed out that this restriction
created the erroneous impression that sabotage or saboteurs
were non--existent in the United States,

The criticism was

timely, for one month later, on August 8, 1942, six young
Nazl saboteurs Ca]Ytured in the United States were electro-

PP•

543-544.
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cuted in the nation's capitol. 1 57

In addition to the rules

on sabotage these revised codes warned that "The Spread of
rumors in such a way that they will be accepted as facts will
render aid and comfort to the enemy." 1 ~~8

Some critics

replied th.at this censorship request was in reality another
attempt by the government to squelch speculation in the press.
Hinting that the aim of this restriction was the suppression
---------of- -fa-ct-s- ra--t-he-r- -t-ha-n- -rumors--J

remedy for rumors were facts. 1 59

such criticism must have

been effective, for in the next edition of the radio and
press codes (December 1., 1943) the restriction on rumors was
noticeablJ' absent.,
Were 't,he restrictions on the reporting of sabotage
justified?

For

:l

long while sabotage was secret.

The

government did not want the public to panic as a result of
lurid sabotage stories in the domestic press. 160 Nor, as in
the case of the captured Nazi saboteurs, did the government
want Germany to know it had captured their agents. 161 In

l.57Burns, .2E• cit., p. 255. Burns reports that
President Roosevel i' s -.,.-;- • • only regret about the six who
died was that they had not been hanged."
1 8
5 cc_:9-..£.__f_oz:_jl_!::.Cll':..dC:.!'·sters ( 2-1-J+J), p. 5: see abo
Co§.e_:for :tdl."'_fress. (2-l-Lij), p. 5.
l59"Expanding Don'ts," !l:El~· J"uly 6, 19l,c2, p. l<O.
160
rn an effort to avoid potential 1)anic the Justice
Department, in the F.alJ. of 1942, issued a statement that no
major acts of sabotage or espionage had been uncovered; see
I
'
I .1ngeman,
_()J2L .•£J.. t. , pp, 1 8 J, 19-l-.
161

s ee " E sp1onage:
.
7 Genera 1 s vs. 8 Saboteurs,"
July 20, 1942, I'• 15.

-~~i:F:~•
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this respect the censorship restrictions might have been
justified.

However, in light of the extremely small number

of' saboteurs apprehended in the United States during the war,
the restrictions were probably unjustified.

Research failed

to turn up more than a dozen actual Axis saboteurs in the
United States during the entire war.

~~he

most celebrated

case was the apprehension of eight young Nazis who had been
- . - - - -la::n-ae--a----o:rr -t-Ire- -s-hore-s-- -of Long

U-boat in 19Lf2. 162

a German

All of these men were caught quick:ly

(four of them had barely gotten off the beaches before they
were apprehended) and six were later executed.
Before the yoluntary codes for radio and the press
were

rd.ssu~'d,

tho Office of Censorship published, on March l,

1943, a special code that regulated the use of nomnilitary
r-adio serv:Lcee. 1·"'''~3

In addition to the 925 commercial radio

stations in thcl United States there were more than ten
thousand private radio transmitters used by law enforcement,
civilian defense, harbor, weather, and forestry services, and
. . 1 servlces
.
.
o tl1er munlclpa
an d facl. 1"l t.
·1es, 164 'j'he Of:flce
of
Censorship stated that the philosophy of regulating these
162

See "War of Nerves: !liission from Berlin," 'l'ime,
July 6, 1942, pp. 13-14.

~•
... d.e o.f •o
o:cn C,ensors,JJ.p,
c:o
Vvar t'1me
I'E"'.<?.!)._::_ps...f:.5?.~...J:.i:~nmil~ tarY- rw,_sJ.ig__ _§cn::~j,_ce~T;-lrdl tloii-·of' March 1,
197.f3 (Washington, D.C.: U.s. Govermnent Printing Office),
1943; herea.:fter referred to as Code for Nonmilitary Radio
16 31 )

, ,

C'
.o.
·Of'['"
. : 1ce

( 3-1-.I.Jj) .

--

16LrK oop, op. cit, ,
p. 185.

radio operators -- "Hams"
duration of the war.

'"" .

--

~.'he activities of amateur
had been stwpended for the
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municipal radio services fell somewhere between the compul.
165
sory and voluntary concepts.
The restrictions on the
broadcasting of certain information generally paralleled
those of the voluntary radio code.

However, nonmilitary

municipal radio services were required to abandon all
unnecessary use of radio facilities,

This special code

warned that "The unnecessary use of :facilities which dis_information of value to the enemy is a total loss to
our war effort," 166 ':Che code for municipal radio services

----~----closes

was esBentially noncontroversial and it remained in force
without criticism or modification until May 15, 1945, when i t
was combined in another code.
On Dec:cmbe:c 1,· 1943, the Office of Censorship reissued
the code :3 for the press and radio. 16 7 This third revision of
the prcess and raclJ.o codes showed little modification in comparison with the previous edition, but merely restated the
pr·ovision:3 of the previous edition,

This new edition o:f the

codes failed to generate significant critical comment.

But

the American press would soon be at war with censorship as a
result of election year politics, soldiers votes, and
military censors.

16

5c~~~

fol:J!.on_!nilit§:EY__Ra.?:},.£ (J-1-4-J), p • 1.

166Ib'd
_ l__ o' P• 2.,
16
7u. s. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime Practic!:'_?__for AmeT~C:..<;:.Yl._Jl2::Ya~c~.ster_§, Edi tior!Q·r"Liecember J, f9hJ,
and Code of Wart1me Practices for the American Press, Edition
of Decli~iii'ber:1~-;-19lf:TlTiashmgton, D.c.; u. s. Govemment
Printing Office), 1943.
r
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Soldic"rs • Suffrage,

In January of 1944 President

Roosevelt called upon Congress to pass a Soldier's Vote Bill
that would provide a single absentee voting .law for eleven
million servicemen on active duty. 168 The President claimed
that the vast majority of these soldiers and sailors, unable
to comply with forty-eight different absentee voting laws in
as many states, failed to vote in past elections.
____ The-·f'-resident'-s message ran into stiff opposition in
Congress.

Republicans charged that the }1 resident, in an

election year, was trying to line up soldiers to vote for his
fourth term.

Southern Democrats feared that the proposed law
would enable Negro soldiers in the South to vote, 16 9 ~rhe
bill nevertheles<:< passed Congress and the Soldiers Vote Act
of l9i+l+

bec>~unc) l3.w.

However, an amendment by Republican

Senato;_' Hobert 'raft to another J.aw 1 '1° forbid circulation by
military authorities of any matter containing "political
argument or political propaganda of any kind designed or
calculated to affect the result of any election" for federal
ce
O .l»·P·i
.l. -··

171

This law, the result of an", •• Unholy Alliance
of Hepublieans and reactionary Southern Democrats . • , , .. 1 72
..

168

Burns , .'212!_S} t. , p • 4 JO.

16 9Ibid.

1 7°The Hatch Act of 19J9.
1 7 1 Quoted in Charles G. Bolte, "The War Fronts:
Solcl:i ers Aren't Supposed to Think," Nation, July 22, 194-4,
PP• 90-91.
---1'/2

-"Dewey and Soldiers Vote,"
July 2'+, 191J.I+, p. 92.

~......B£)2u£li£,

lOJ
provided military authorities with a censo:r;-ship weapon
unprecendented in American history.
ArmJ' officials began barring various publicatlons and
periodlcals from post exchanges and llbraries on the grounds
these materlals contained "political propaganda."

Army

authorities justlfied their actions on the basis of the Taft
amendment, which protected military voters from politlcal
- - - - - -inf1uence

o

In one case the Army forbid circulation on its bases
of Charles A, Beard • s book, The Republi_9_, on the grounds it
was political propaganda. 1 7J One magazine reported that the
Army prohibited liberal or pro-New Deal periodicals from
being sold at

pos·~

exchanges, accepting instead only conser-

vat.i V(~ or pro- Eepublican ones, i7Li·

Another contemporary

periocJ.ica.l cont2.:lned three letters from soldiers who charged
that their superiors forbid the availability of such maga-zines as Nation, New Republic, Harpers, and Atlantic. 175 One

----- ------·-

--~---

of these soldiers complained that a packet of Nation back
issues, mailed to him by his mother, was rejected by Army
officials as "controversial.."
were having a field day.

Reactionary Army authorities

The movie "VIi.l.son" was banned from

post theaters, 8.nd. a biography of Oliver Wendell Holmes from

1

73"Dangerous Army Censorship," New ReJ!..1!J?li9.,
July 24, 1944, p. 92.
174-Ib'.!. d

p. 22).

t

17,..
.J"I,etters to the Editors," .tJa"!lon, August 19, 191+4,

Army library lists because they were consi.dered politically
propagandistic in content.

Army officials, in one sweep,

ordered 142 American newspapers removed from soldier's
·
clubs·. 176
serv2ce
Perhaps the most blatant and ridiculous abuse of
authority by military officials came when an edition of the
instruction book, the "Official Guide to the Army Air Forces"
_____ -was- -remo-ved- f:com--1\:rmy library lists be cause .i. t bore a picture
of President Franklin Roosevelt over the caption "CommanderIn-Chief of the Army and Navy."

Other editions of the

instruction book which did not carry Hoosevel.t's picture were
retained on the l~brary lists. 1 7'7
This was but anothe:c infamoun incident in a long list
of Army abuses of the power of censorship. 1 7 8

Accor·ding to

Zechariah Chafee, "Military censorship has always tended to
exceed its bounds and go into political censorship."i79
Military censorship :in World War II, like the Office of Censorship, served an important and v.i tal function.

1'hey .both

kept vital information from reaching the enemy.

But, unlike

the Office of Censorship, military authorities fed greedily
upon their· censorship powers,

6
pp. lt0-42.
177 11) .l. (1. e

l'7 .. Idea Blackout,"

They continually tried to

J1e~§X':.~ek, August

21, 194·11.,

178
· l~ewsweek reported that the Navy had ordered no
censorsh:ip-OT-riT'c'lrctture or entertainment, ibid.

l79chafee, op. cit., p. 465.
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strengthen Rnd expand their influence over.American society.
Denying soldiers access to political argumentation perverted
a fundamental.part of the political process.

The heart of

any election contest is debate and disagreement; when
controversy is censored and eliminated elections become
meaningless and needless.

Even with the cessation of

official government censorship at the end of the war,
mi-1-ttary- au-t:ho:t'ities -continued to impose their own brand of'
censorship on the American press.

A reporter and a photog-

rapher were detained by military police and part of their
equipment confiscated when, more than a week after the war
was over, they tried to collect interviews and pictures
a·board a troop train. l.SO

Capricious censorship by m.ili tary

authorities was e. burden on the Office of Censorship, and on
the country, during World War II.

the security of the atomic bomb project was
censors' most exciting assignment . • •

It"

,.181

• the
From the

spring of 194-J, when the atomic bomb project began, until
Presideni; Truman's announcement on August 6, 191•5, that the
bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, hardly a day went by that
the O:ffice of Censorship did not have to issue a confidential
warning concerning accidental allusion to the secret project.
Thousands of persons in the United States knew of the c;ecre-c

HlOKoop,

.2:f!..!..._£~_!, ,

181J.£:i,s!·. p. 272.

p, 2'?0,

106

atomic experiments.

Thousands more could J:tave made accurate

guesses about the importance of the project simply by
=

referring to Censorship's admonitions.

The Office of Censor-

shj.p warned against broadcasting or publishing any information at all concerning atom smashing, atomic energy, atomic
fission, atom splitting, radium, nidioacti.ve materials, heavy
water, hi.{:!;h voltage discharge equipmcmt, cyclotrons, polonium,
-ur-.:'3..-n-i-um-,---yt-t-erbium~
•
182
or deu·..I· erJ.um.

hafnium, protactinium, thenium, thoritun~

The list seemed endless.

Add to this the fact that the atomic bomb project
(!mown under the code name "Manhattan Project") required the
use of over one-half million acres of land and the virtual
:i.solation of nearly one hundred thousand work0rs 18 J and their
families, and tlw extent of Censorship • s job can begin to be
x·eaJ.ized.

Heference to atomic power or its long list of

related subjects had to be deleted from all types of publications -·· even comic books,

One

SUJ2~..,?..2}

issue showed that

comic strip hero withstanding a bombardment of electrons from
a cyclotron.

At the request of the Office of Censorship the

story was real'ranged and future issues of

~man

avoided

mentioning anything related to atomic power, 181+ Fictional
accounts of the use of atomic power had to be modified or
deleted when they came too close to the truth.

p. 273.
181j'Ib' d
~OJ p. 2'?7 •.

10?

After the bomb had been dropped on Japan, editors and
broadcasters were released from their. promise to omit discussion of the weapon, much to the dismay of military
authorities.

Of the secrecy surrounding the Manhattan

Project, Byron Price said:
Been a newspaperman all my life and
the only thing I could do about the
greatest story of the age, or any
l8
age, was pray nobody would p:r.int it. 5
When

~tr!e-

aton1Tc- r)omh vias dropped on Japan,- one of the biggest

-- and last

jobs of the Office of Censorship was finished.

The success of the atomic bomb project was due, in a very
large part, to the efforts of the Office of Censorship and
the American press and radio.
Voluntary censorship provided a second line of
defense in the

wa~·

on words,

9".'he rapport and cooperation

that existed between the Office of Censorship and the
American Press and radio was a significant contribution to
the Allied victory in world War II.

1'hat victory not only

secured the rit:;ht of freedom for millions of people
throughout the world, it also helped secure the right of a
free pres:3 to exist in the United States during a very
difficult time of war.

18
p • 22 e

5Q.uoted in "Intercepts,"

N~U2.~'ker, May 11, 1946,
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VICTORY, DEA'rH, AND FREEDOM
Relaxed Vigilance: The Final Edition of the Codes
~
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•
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•«W _ _ _

On May 15, 19~·5, the Office of Censorship issued the
_---- --Tinarectl tion -of th-e voluntary censorship codes, 1 Although
four separate media are included -- the press, domestic and
nonmilitary radio, and, for the first time, television --this combined code covers less than three printed pages.
Many previous restrictions were absent from this new edition,
most notably tho2e that dealt wi tll v;eather and sabotage.
remaining requests were greatly condensed.

The

Tllis w2.s the last

voluntal'Y censorship code issued by the Office of Censorship;
it remained in effect until the end.of the war.

"The first and last principle to be remembered • • •
is that censorship should come into being solely as an instrument of war." 2·

1'hus Byron Price, in his final report as

------~--------

1

.
U. s. Offlce of' Censorship, Code of' Wartime
Praetices for the American Press ancl""J\2:cB:o~-EdTilon of
i\irny rs-.-'T945\WElShington';"iT.c .7u--:-s-:-Govermnent Printing
Off.i.ee) , 191+5,

211yron Price, quoted in Historical Reports on W,,_r

~dminiGtr-c::tion, :L__ReE_Sr~_£J:!__!he_ Of;f:i_c:_<?__£f C-~-l2:~SJ_r.'Shi,p (Wash-

lngton, D.C.: U.s. Government Printing ofl':;_ce, 191->5), p. l.
108
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Director of the Office of Censorship, limited the use of cenOn August 15, 1945, just one day

sorship in a free society.

after the victory over Japan, President Truman signed the
following order to the Director of the Office of Censorship:
In accordance with the recommendation
submitted by him on June 27, 1945, the
Director of Censorship shall on
August 15, 1945:
l, Declare .. voluntary censorship of
- - -- - -th-e .l:fre_s_s- and radio at an end.
2. Direct that the Office of Censorship cease at once the censorsh.ip
of all in·ternational communications.
J, Give JO days notice to all employees
of the Office of Censorship, except
for a small group needed for
liquidation of the Agency.J
'J:he o':ffice of Censorship was out of business.
operated for .forty-four months.
.

It had

Employing, at the peak of'
h.

.its opel.'ations, :LI.i-,1}62 persom>,.., the Office of Censorship
spent approximately $90,000,000,5

According to Byron Pr.ice,

if resu1 ts could be measured. in dollars and cents, the funds
provided for voluntary censorship would represent the best
investment in security ever made by the United States. 6
On the same day that President 'J:ruman ordered the
demobilization of the Office of Censorship, Byron Price
notified the nation's editors ancl broadcasters that official

The peak was in February of l9l•J.
5lJJi_£. ' p. J. 0.

.

~~:heodore_Koop, Yi?-~E~- . -~(Silenc_~.

Un~ versrty

of

Gh~cago

(Chicago:
Pross, 19461. · p, 2Lf6,
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censorship had ceased, and that the Code of Wartime Practices
for the American Press and Radio was cancelled.?
The American press and radio were an "army behind the
.

army"

8

that achieved victory over the enemies o:f freedom in

the war on words,

1'hat victory was a welcome death bell that

tolled the end of the Office of Censorship.

~~hat

victory was

also a freedom bell that rang in the restoration of a free

?Director of tbe Office of Censorship, PR-65,
[Press Release No. 65] (WashiDgton, D.C.: U. S~ Office of
Censorship), [August 15, 1945].
8u. S. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime
Practices for American Broadcasters,-rKdi'ri'on-oJ: January 15,
19 2 \'iia.i3Eii1gfon-; n.c-.:~u.-·s-:-Governrnent [Printing Office,
19'1·2 ) ' p. '1.
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

The Office of _Censorship: A J;aclc of Attention
The Office of Censorship has recej_ved an undeserved

l____.__l§.c:_k_p_;L_at~tcm:t:ion- .f-rom- historians
research of World War II.

involved in scholarly

The introductory chapter of·this

paper gives two main reasons for that lack of attention:
historians interested in the war years of

19Lf2--19~'5

have

tended to concentrate on the war itself, leaving the domestic
picture largely unde\reloped; 1 and the inaccessibility o:f
governme.JYC docur,;,o,nts directly rel::rt<·d to the Office of' Censor ..
ship hinders a full or even adequatl' analysis of that office.

Becaucc the Federal Goven11nent still refuses, at this
:Late da:tE• ,. to release pertinent documentary evidence on the

Of.f.ice of Censorship, the historian is forced to rely- upon
secondnr;y· sout'ces.

The number of secondary- sources dealing

wit);. the Off:i.ee o.f Censorship is quite small..

I<'ortmmtely-, a

nvmber of people who wer-e directly involved with Censorship
activ.:i tJ.Es during World War II, incJ.uding the Director of the
Offi e•:~ o:f:' Cen.sor-ship, Byron Price, are still 1iving.

1

Some of

"Jhn F. Heath,, "Dotn\:fltie America during World War II:
RE•search Gppcr·tcm:i.ti.c>; for Historians," The Journa.J. ·of
Ame·:c.l,c,ln Hist.._•rJ, LVIII (~;eptember, 1971T;--:.Jotr;-·---........,.,-...
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these persons have willingly and eagerly o.ffered their
assistance, through correspondence and personal interviews,
in thls research project.
Compulsory

~-l8orshlp:

Planned Success

Compulsory censorship was a·planned success.
to work, for there were no alternatives.

It had

Submission to com-

pulsory- :r.;eguJ.affons was mandatory, with stl:Lf penalties
noncompliance or disobedience.

Compulsory censorship was
often ruthletc>s and almost always arbl trary. 2 The ul timat8
objective of compulsory censorship, or, for ths.t matter, all

censorship, wa.s t'? deprive the enemy of aid and comfort and

.
. help him klll
.
Amer1cans.
.
3
J.nformation
thctt would

It was

necessar;{ to i:eq1 a watch on the borders of the United States
to see that valuable information was not allowed to escape
and fall into the hands of the enemy.

For example, a clerk

who, unwittingly or intentionally, included shipping dates
and routes in his cables could easily assist a submarine
commander in aiming his torpedos,
Compulsory censorship also had to protect valuable
conuriodit.ies: essential to the A:Llied prosecution of the war.
There were within the United States dur:i.ng the war a small

,,
"'Director of the Office of Censorship, PR-29, [Press
Release No. 29_] (WaHhhigton, D.C.: U.S. O{fice"o'f'-Cerisor-ship,
August lJ, l.9lf2.), p. 1. These Censorship press releases. here-af'ter reJ'rnTc'd to as Censor[lhip Press Release No.
, (date).

--.

p. l..

--·-~~---------·------

..

·~---·
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number of Axis spies and trained agents.

An important part

of the job of compulsory censorship dealt with putting these
spiEHl and agents out of business.

One former Censorship

employee has claimed that 189 spies were caught and convicted
in the United States during the war. 4

This paper retells two

of those spy stories.
But compulsory censorship was not always used for its
intended purpose.

There were persons in the Federal Govern-

ment who were willing to use censorship regulations to.stifle
criticism of the government,
infamous of these cases.

'l'he Kellems story was the most

Byron Price was probably innocent

of any malfeasance. in the Kellems incident, but there is no
substantial evid<"·nce currently available to allow an adequate
assessment of
this ease.

th~'

guilt or .innocence of any one pGrson in

However, based on the evidence that is available,

inve.stigation of the Kellems case should begin near the top
of' goveJ:nmt:mt echelons rather than the bottom.
Compulsory censorship was used well and abused badly,
Its use provided for a planned success in the war on wordst
its abuse remains a warning sign to those who must direct, o:r.
be directed by, :future censorship programs.

G(mr>orship was the main weapon used in the war on
words, and that weapon ·had to be aimed where the words were.
1

+Mary Kn:Lght, "'l'he Secret War of Censors vs. Spies,"
R>::s,td~E.§..J21£.j.£§.!, !Vlar'ch, 191+6, p, '?9.
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It had to be aimed at those who held dear the free and
unlimited use of words -·- the American press and radio •.
'rhe Director of the Office of Censorship was under
instructions from the President to".

• coordinate the

voluntary effort of press and radio to withhold from circulation information which would aid the enemy in his prose--

j__

cution of the war.".5

The Office of Censorship, under the
-

able leadership of Byron Price, constructed and issued the
voluntary censorship codes that were used to regulate the use
of free speech by the press and radio.

Any regulation of

free speech produces an immediate reaction in a society that
reveres and deifiEls that freedom.

The regulation and

restrict1on o:r free speech was based. on a quasi-military
strategy,

'01ben

planning a battle ctrategists must assess

the necessary sacrifices tha.t will enable the army to w:Ln
the battle.

In the war on words the limits of free speech

had to be narrowed.

The soldiers themselves -- broadcasters

and editors -- had to accept this meaGured sacrificr.'! if the
war was to be won.

Newspapers and radio had to limit their

'traditional tendencies to speculate, advise, and criticize.
Failure to do this, in some cases, might have aided t!Je enemy.
The American press and radio were sometimes recalci triJ.nt ~ but

most often cooperative.

1'hey realized that refusal to

cooperate under a system of voluntary censorship, regar(l.loss
of how Etringent the regulations sometimes were, could

.5Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.

h8.Vt~
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resulted in reversion to a system of complete compulsion.
And the country was not lacking for proponents of
complete compulsion.

They existed in the highest government

offices and in the nation's newsrooms.

The efforts of the

Roosevelt administration to make the "Official Secrets Bill"
the law of the land provides support for this statement.
J<'ortunately for the country the Office of Censorship was
headed by a man who believed that the war on words could be
won without complete abrogation of freedom of speech.

To

achievce this the voluntary censorship codes were reviewed
every six months and modified and reissued whenever the need
wo.s indicated,

Not all material considered for publication

was submitted to the Office of Censorship for clearance,
Editol~e:

and broacJ;;e.sters submitted only those items that were

doubtful in 11ature.

Daily newspapers also received frequent

directives from the Office of Censorship automatically, ·tJnw
further eliminating the need to submit much material.

By

referring to i;he voluntary codes many decisions could be made
within the editorial offices of a newspaper.
'l'be item that provided the most difficulty was the
publication of' unit identifications and ship names and
addresses for soldiers and sailors.
paper that Joe

Doal~:s

A notice in a home town

was stationed in England with the First

Armored Division could. easily a_ssist the enemy in assessing
Allied troop strength.
the small

weel~:lies,

This problem was most frequent with

church bt!lletins, and home tovm news

coluxms that merely wanted their readers to have some news of
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their friends and neighbors.

To combat this problem the

Office of Censorship offered the best advice i t could:
If you know what ship a sailor is
on, or what company or regiment a
soldier is with overseag, then you
know a military secret.
This warning was usually effective.
Most of the personnel of the Office of Censorship
tried to do the ber;t job they could.
··- and expected.

But mistakes were made

Sometimes these mistakes resulted from a

momentary lack of foresight,· and other timer; they were the
direct result of government interference.

Byron Price stated

that the Office of Censorship " . • , was almost completely
free of instructions or interference under two Presidents."?
But tho frr:>E•clom of speech was not. always free from interfercnce by govex·mnent of:ficiah' -·· including Presidents.
case of

_§ocial~tice_

The

-- the organ for Father Charles

Coughl:i.n, the ''radio priest" -- provides an example of this
kind of interference.

The Office of Censorship could also

bring down its ovm brand of wrath upon a newspaper that
failed to comply with Censorship requests.
and the

1:'h.~l.ade1El.!~flpi}y

'l'he Molotov visit

Nev;s. story was a case in point,

A large part of Censorship • s job wo-,s protecting
military secrets.

Vital information about ships, planes, and

troops had to be withheld.

Plans for the invasion of Europe

.
~'rheodore. Koop, .Y~~ap_on of Sil.~nct:, ( Chic:ago:
Um.ve1:·sJ.ty of ChJ.cago Press, 194b), p. 238 •.
'?Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971..

l17
had to be protected from premature disclosure.

Weapons

development and related experiments were known by many
editors and broadcasters, but they wi ti1held publication of
this information .. Byron Price felt the atomic bomb project
was the best kept secret of the war. 8 This secret became
"the censors' most exciting assignment."9
"For the most part, the program of voluntary compli____

--------------------------

. ..

. . 1

('I

ance was a complete success ... ~-

But; according to Byron

Price, ", , , if the experiment of voluntary compliance had
failed, advocates of compulsion were ready to take the field
without a moments delay," 11

'l'he threat of compulsion pro-

vided the impetus for compliance with the voluntary codes,
making voluntary censorship .. • . • an iron fist in a velvet
glove~;; :1. 2

'£he progn:;_m of voluntary cem;orship of tb.e American
press and radio was a strategic success -- in spite of the
Army.

That the program was a success is proved by the :fact

that the proponents of compulsory censorship failed to gain
the upper hand.

And they tried,

And they had support.

'I'hey

had the statistical support of a frightening majority of the

B"Out of Office: Gone, the Blue Pencil," Newsweek,
August 27, 1945, pp. 78-79.
9Koop, 5~E.!___9it., p. 272.
10

J-olm Fetzer to writer, November 18, 19'(1.

g_£ni§~rship...;..P~.r;s Rcl2_f?:.S..£_.No. 6_f.l., August 30, 194 5.
12
sh~;rman J-I. Dryer, Hadio In Wartime (New York:

11

Greenberg, Publisher, Inc, , ·-T91i2-)~p;---27-,.-
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Americs.n people.

One study made during the first week of the

war revealed that eighty-five percent of the American people
approved of governmental delay in providing news of the
attack on Pearl Harbor.

Only one person in ten felt censor-

ship was too strict, twenty percent felt it was too lax, and,
throughout the war, two-thirds of the people felt they were
being told a.s much as the government could tell them. 13

Sta t.?s came out second- best,

Thousands of American sailors

suffered violent deaths at the hands of a momentarily
superior Japanese navy.

The United states Government pleaded

that such gra:phic .war news would adversely affect public
~mel nw.ch of

morale,
a survey

X;(~:Ld

by

this news wcu; delayed or withheld.

But

the Offic:e of War Information in 19/j-J

revealed that a plu:r.ali ty of tlJ.e Americt:tn pe.ople .approved of

printing news stories and pictures "showing how American
- .... _
So lclier"'

·
·
"14
are suff·er1ng
anu·' d yu1g.

These were the forces with which Byron Price had to
wrestle in the war on words-- theproponents of compulsion
and an apathetic populace with a latent appetite for gore!

!Vli.li tary censorship threatened freedom of speech more

than any other form of censorship uBed in the war on words.
1

1

3Dar;ieotl Ka:z , .'?_t~ a=-.~· o f_ll9l::t_~9p1:1J-~~~~-ED~1~J'.[O)i@J];,<md~
(New Yorlu ho 1 , HJ.ne 1'!art and Wu1ston, 19 ;;·l· 1 , p. •13.
1 '+rtid.
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Military censorship was ubiquitous; it permeated the entire
range of the compulsory.and voluntary censorship programs.
Army offidalr; tested their cenr;oring strength not only in
the realm of free.speech; but also in the realm of free
thought.

Overzealous and reactionary Army officials, inter-

preting law to satisfy their own whims, tried to regulate the
pJ~inted

material read by American servicemen.

When President

R-60£1eve~JX a11oweo:--the Soldiers Vote BHl to become law, l5 he
gave his military opponents a censorship weapon they never
dreamed they would get.

Thir; law, with its related amendment,

allovmd .Army officialr; to clas8ify anything they did not like
boolw, movies, n<;;wspapers, even a picture of the President

of trw United st,~;tcs -- as political propaganda o
'I'he ef:f:'orts of military myrm:i dons threatened the

Bllccer::s of' voluntary censorship and argues strongly in favor

of civilian control of future censorship programs,

Byron PriCE! watJ fifty yea.rs old when President Roose-velt asked him to r;ecome the Director of tlw Of'f':i.ee of Censorship,

Half' of his life had been Bpent as a

n<~vmpapcrman

freedom of the press was a ma;jor part of hiB life o

1

and

He would

5Roosevelt wss disappointed with the bill in :i:ts
final form, ec:pecially when it was accomp:cmied with tbe :raft
amendment to the Hatch Act of 19J9, which prohibited tho
trancmir;s:i.on of political propaganda to servicemen on active
duty, ~'he President allowed the bill to become law without
his Eignature; Bee ,James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, 'l'hco
SoldifH· of Fn~edom (New York: Harcourt Bl"nce-Jc;:i/ari.'o·v·J.·c.h,Ii1c-;..;-T970T;-·:p-;·-z.f3 1 .
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no more unquestioningly surrender that freedom than he would
his life, for to surrender one would be tantamount to
surrendering both.

But Price believed " • • • there was

no'thing automatic about the establishment of. free speech in
the United States • • • ,16 Price disliked censorship; it
wa$ almost automatic for any conscientious newspaperman to
find censorship distasteful.

The opposing concepts of

job of administering one and preserving the other is placed
in the hands of the same man.

It was necer;sar;,r for' Price to

convince his professional associates of the need to balance
censorship and free speech, and to persuade them that
voluntary cen:::o1·ship ·during wartime could work to preserve
the :freed''""' of speech and thE: pres2,

Most of these persons

•,... ce. • s pernuas:J.Ve
.
l ' l 'J.t·y. J?
were move""'1.:q l"rJ
an
·

Even as he

persuaded broadcasters and editors to cooperate with the
requests of voluntary censorship, Price reminded them ·that
his remarks were made "

, • in justification of' censorship,

18

It would be redundant to state here

not in praise of it,"

·the ways in which Price was able to balance the needs of

war~

time censorsllip against the preservation of free speech.

It

p. 2.

P•

?.

121

is enough to say he did it -- the feat speaks for itself.
During the war many persons criticized the Office of
Censorship, Byron Price, the government, and the military
excursion into censorship.

After the war many persons

continued to criticize the government and military censorship,
but most had nothing but praise for Byron Price.

Journalist

Arthur Krock, in a scathing attack on censorship, was still
abre-1;0 saYtlifit -tne Uf'fice of Censorship was " . • • ably and
intelligently administered."l9

Professor Zechariah Chafee of

the University of Chicago also praised Price's skill in
' . . t er~ng
.
t -he program o f vo 1 un t·ar·y censors h.J.p. 20
aumJ.nJ.s
The voluntary censorship program was not perfect; it
could have been better.

And it could have been worse.

A

very delicate balance was maintained. between the rights of a
free preBro and tlle necessities of wartime censorship.

That

delicate balance depended upon the ability of Censorship
officials to recognize the value of free speech and the
limits of censorship.
and those limits.

Byron Price recognized those values

His singular ability enabled him to

successfully administer the program of voluntary censorship.
Voluntary censorship had been tried before and it had failed.
Byron Price, and the members of the American press and radio,
proved that such a program could. work.

1.9Arthur Krock in "Public Opinion Quarterly," Spring,
191>2, .PP. 21+--26, reprinted in Robert E. Summers ( comp,),
Wartime Censorship of Press and Hadio (New Yor·k: H. W. Wilson
t;o!i'lpimy, "'T9l:f:;n--;-p: 22)-.--··---------

20Chafee, 2~ci~.
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Perhaps this paper's appraisal of the Director of the
Office of Censorship is best summarized by quoting the man
himself:
You •ve got to be unspeakably profane
on the subject of censorship or
you've no right to be a censor at
all • , • . I had that right,21
Byron Price had had a full career in journalism
behind him when he came to the Office of Censorship.

When

President Roosevelt summoned him to be Director of Censor.ship, Price was serving as Executive News Editor of the
Associated Press, the foremost position in that organiz.ation.
In 1944 Price was a,warded a special Pulitzer citation for
the creation and administration of the volunta.ry censorship code:.~. 22

While the Office of Censorship was being

demobilized. in 1945, President Truman asked Price to go to
Germany as his personal representative to mak:e a study of'
tht" relations between the American occupation forces and. the
German people, 2 3 In 1946 President 1'ruman awarded Price the
Medal for Merit in recognition of his able administration of
the Office of Censon>hip and for his unique skill at
organizing "the American press and radio within the sys·t.cm of
voluntary censorship.

21

In

191~,8

he was made an honorary Knight

BKron Price, quoted in "Intercepts,"
May 11' 19 f6 t p. 22.
22

2''

.N..!'l.YJ_,X.9rk~r,

~].!_()_:_!;1 Wll<?__in_~me_ric~?:, XXIV ( 191+6), p. 1906.

..>Historical Reports on War Administration, A l1eJ.lort
on the Offiee of Censorship (Washington, D.C.: u, s·:-·c"ovei'niiient._i5i7frrfrriii···(Tf1'Tc(i7._I9If:Sf, p. 18; hereaftc,r re:Cen"ed to as
11e.;eort _9!!._!he _,9!fice of C<,:}2.@.£rsh?:l!_.
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Commander of the British

l~mpire

by George VI of England.

24

From 1947 to 1954 Byron Price served as an Assistant
Secretary-General of the United Nations and was responsible
for directing the construction of the buildings that house
that organization today. 2 5 In 1951i. Price retired to his
home in Chestertown, Maryland, where he lives today.

------

The War on Words: Rems.ining QmJstions
·--·---

---------------=·=~~=----.-~---------~~-~.

This paper has probably raised more questions than it
has answered.

Who leaked the Kellems correspondence to Drew

Pearson and John Coffee?
source?

Was the State Department the

Was someone acting on instructlons from President

Roosevelt aB Vi.v5.en Ke.llems charged'?

These correspondence

"Intercepts" are lodged in the National Archives and cannot
be opened except on order of the President of the United
States. 26 Did the Roosevelt Administration attempt to subvert its pul)lic position on voluntary censorship by bac:ldng
the r;o .. called "Official Secrets Bill?"

What influenc:e did

the Army exert in support of this bill for complete and
compulsory censorship?

The activities of Army officials in

thwarting or impeding the circulation of liberal or pro-"Ne\•1
Deal publications certainly indicates their approval of com-

24
}'1J}2":"s Who j,n_ftm£_JZiC"<!; 1 XXVI, 0950) 1 PP•
2 5Based on personal interview with Norman
January 11, 1972; sec also "V/her"l Are They Now?"
October 2, 1961, p. 14·.
.

2215-·2216.
Carlson,
Newsweek,

""_______ _

··l(.,
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Censors h'J.J?., p, 18 ,

plete and compulsory censorBhip.

Many persons were convicted

of evading censorship regulations, and they often received
harsh punishment.

Were these convictions always justified,

or were the Federal courts sympathetic to J·ustice Department
prosecutions?

That civil liberties for select minorities

were abandoned by the government during the war is, for many,
a foregone conclusion.

But what about Velvalee Dickinson's

case prejudiced because of her social relationships with
persons of ,Japanese ancestry?

Similar incidents of such

racial jingoism were not unknov·m in the United States during
Worlcl War II.
Cenr-wrship restrictions on radio programming were
stringeJYt; and w3ually strictly enfoi·ced.
were instantaneous,

Had.io transmirssi.ons

An';/ radio mescage, whether intended for

domestic listeners or, as the government feared, for enemy
agents, could be easily monitored by enemy naval craft close
by the shores of the United States.

But because the radio

waves were so well-monitored by the Federal Co1mnunica tions
Commission, no such enemy transmissions wel'e actually documented during the entire war.

Indeed, one researcher has

determined that there was but a single attempt at a radio
transmission from a station in the United States to Nazi
Germany.

'J'hat radio transmi. tter was Joca.ted in the German
Embassy i.n Vl<tshington and it was immediately silenced, 2 7
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There is one remaining question that must be considered here.

Does the United States Government maintain

viable contingency plans for official censorship in the event
of a future world war?

According to Norman Carlson, former

Chief Postal Censor, there remained after the war a censor··
ship "shadow organization".that included a. "Directordesignate,"
---

Byron Price, after his retirement from the

------------

United Nation-s i.i1I9 )1-f; became a consultant to -the government
on censorship plmming.
designate,

In effect, he was the Director-

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962

Price was again asked, this time by President Kennedy, to
assume the

respon~ibility

of directing a censorship program

in tho ev<mt of vmr.
Following the Cuban missile crisis Price requested
his reJ.erme as Director-designate for censorship planning.
He was then past seventy years of age; a new generation had
succeeded to the news desks of the country· and Price felt he
no longer had the necessary contacts in Washington and elsewhere that would allow him to function effectivel;>r as the
Director of future censorship programs.

President Johnson

eventually granted Price's req_uest, choosing as his replacement Theodore Koop, who had been the Assistant Director of
the Office of Censorship during V/orld War n. 28 Koop was in
turn released from this position by President Nixon.

28 r f
. plann1.ng
.
. .n: orma t..1..on on f u t.ure censorshJ.p
based on
personal intervicnv with Norman Carlson, ;ranua.ry 1.1, 1972,
and Byron Price to writer, F'ebruary 25, 19?2,
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'fhe position of Director-designate was abolished on
December i5, 1970.

Censorship planning is now handled by

the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the old title
"Office of Censorship" has been replaced with that of
"Wartime Information Security Program," 29 Future wartime
censorship problems are being considered even now.

Sophis-

ticated communications systems spawned by the world-wi.de
te-chnological revolu'tlon are constantly being analy?.ed in
relation to the goverrunent' s ability to censor them.

Tele··

vision, communications satellites, interplanetary communications, even the possibility of transmitting messages by a
laser beam that cannot be interrupted or broken, are just a
few of the ))J:·ob:Lems be:i.ng worlwd on today by the Office of

In an 2-ddx·ess befor-e the Georgia Press Institute in
191+4, Byron Price listed the principles he felt should be
adhered to in the event censorship should again become
necessary.JO

These pr:i.nciples generally paralleled the

provisions of' the voluntary censorship codes used in World
War II.

Each of these principles could also be interpreted

as individual indictments of either military or governmental
sup11ression of free speech,

Price, as did many others,

recognized the potenth\1 danger of governmental suppress:i.on

2 9Eugene J, Quindlen, Assistant Direetor for Government Preparedness, to writer, March 15, 1972,
194~-'

JO Censorshin Press Release No. 54, Februarv 19,

p. If:-·---·-=---- .

"
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of opinion and criticism.

The reactionary, rhetoric of

Social Justice was easily discernable, butwould gover-nment
suppression of a newspaper, even if it was of the same ilk

as

_!?ocial Justice, be as easily accomplished and condoned

today as it was in 1942?

Probably not,

The recent attempt

of the Federal Government to impose prior restraint on those
papers that published the so.:.called "Pentagon Papers" stands
as proof that the government prefers some type of censorship. ·
Price's principles take into account the efforts of the Army
to impose repressive censorship during World War II.

There

is evidence today that the Army continues to use it'S own
brand of censorship.

'rheir efforts to cover up the "!Vly Lai

!Vlassacre" and similar incidents, suggests that official
cerwox-ship is in fact a reality.
In the event of a future global war, the conflict
will be of such immense proportions that military superiority will undoubtedly assume primary importance.

In the

military mind this will inclu:i e, if we are to recognize the
lessons of' history, the complete submission of a free press,
and with it free speech, to the dictates of military rule.
The American press, and the people, ·should prepare for that
possibility, and ])rotect themselves against it,
event, censorship will surely come.

For in that

Even while reviewing

the past from the advantageous perspective of the present
one mu:.o;t admit that the withholding of some strategic information f'rom public knowledge was necessary during World War
II, and will be necessary in World War III.
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During World war II Byron Price sought to expose
unfounded rumors in order to prevent public panic,

But

rumors must be fought with facts, and all possible factual
information must be made available to the people.

The

majority of the requests in the voluntary censorship codes
during World War II were valid and justified.
some mistakes,

There were

rrhe seriousness of those mista.kes is easily

exaggerated, but -thei should not be unduly dismissed.

An

analysis of the conduct of federal and military officials in
regards to censorship during the war demands that one condemn utilization of the "necessities of war" to silence
valid criticism of, a politically conscious administration.
The realith:r; o:f the period require that one recognize that
th('' pubJic p;:·ol>abJ.y supported the suppression of pro-fascist
nowrc>J>apors lilr.e Social JustiN,,

But in the event of a

future conflict we must insure that a journalist or news-"
paper has clearly and undeniably, in public trial, violated
the Espionage Act before that newspaper or journalist is
suppressed and f>ilenced.
From 191+2 to 1945 news of the war was often delayed
and misrepresented, sometimes at the request of Army authorities, sometimes at the request of administration officials.
Tho voluntax'Y censorship system administered by Byron Price
was undoubtedly better than the alternatives available in
the war on words.

No censorship at all in tiu1e of war is

clearly unrealistic.

But compulsory censorship of the :free

press and. radio would have only served to provide the United
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States with enemies in its own camp.
Censorship in wartime has been an historical reality.
Voluntary systems were tried during the American Civil War
and World War I.

Both of these voluntary systems collapsed

and were replaced by a form of compulsory censorship.

Censor-

ship of a free press and radio will be a reality in the next
global conflict.

That censorship system must be voluntary
- - ---

and under civilian control if a free press ·-- and free
speech -- are to endure.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I have relied heavily on documents from the
Office of Censorship.

b:_ Rep or~. on the Office of

u.

S.

CeJ:l~§_l}J:...P..

was prepared in 19LJ·5 by Byron Priee and his staff as part of
1

the Historieal Reports on War Administration.

J~-·-------i:rrg-ly---s-1-roj:t-rep-ort--,-i-t-- does-

A disappoint-

contain valll.8.ble_ inf_orma.tion on_

the organizational period of the Office of Censorship.
A collection of the wartime censorship codes is

available at the library of the University of California at
Berkeley.

1'his collection
includes the ~.~.--·---~---~--Code of Wartime Prac.

Postal Censorshi£_,Begulations. . Study of these codes was
indispensable to the research.
Also in the University of California library is a
small collection of press releases issued by the Director of
the Office of Censorship from January, 1942, through August,

191+5.

Very incomplete (there are only fifty .. eight press

releases in this library-bound volume), these press releases
supplem.ent thEJ various edi ticins of the censorship codes;
they also contain textual copies of addresses by Byron Price,
'l'he:co has been only one boolc published on the Office
of Cem.;orship and it was used extensively in the writing of

lJO
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this paper.

Wea;pon of Silence, by

~~he odor~

a wide range of Censorship activities.

Koop, documents

Koop was the

Assistant Director of the Office. of Censorship, and while he
was justifiably critical of military censorship, he did not
always revj.ew government censorship with the same critical
judiciousness.
Wartime
---

Summers, is

C~~g_rsh:iJ2..

of Press and

-priiiiarlly a -cciJ.lection

l:~s.dio,

by Hobert E,

of articles reprinted

from various newspapers and magaz,ines, some now defunct,
from 1941 to 1942.

Summers generally upholds the necessity

of wartime censorship as a defense against enemy propaganda.
Published in August, 194·?., the book is limited because it

covers only the f'.irst few months of Censorship operationsG

Deal, has an excellent account of the relationship betwe.en
President Roosevelt and the "Radio Priest."

Tull denies the

charge that Coughlin was a fascist, a charge the Roosevelt
administration made when suppressing

Socia~--·~L.t!~ice,

David Kahn's The Codebreakers: The _story of Secret
Writing, is a well-documented history of secret writing,
codes, and cryptography.

Kahn includes a short but relevant

section on Censorship opera:tiorw durtng World War II.
,Tames MacGregor Burns'

Rooseve~!.!.-~!le S.£.~9. ~~r

of

FreEO..dorn, is one of the very few works available on the last
Roosevelt administration.

Burns includes essential infor-

mation on the suppression of Social Just:lce and on ·the
-~-

Soldiers Vote Act of 1941+,
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Concentrating on the domestic aspects of the United
States during World War II, Don • t You Know 1'here 's A Viar On?
The

AJ:leri9.§:!2J:!Om~

Front, 1941-1945, by Richard R. Lingeman,

briefly reviews some of the activities of the Office of
Censorship.

The book is indispensable fol" those interested

in the social history of the period.
War Information and Censor_fi_hip is a small book coauthored by Elmer :Davis and Byron Price who were, respectively, the Directors of the Offices of Viar Information and
Censorship at the time the boolc was published,

A propaganda

document, the book is interesting for its occasionally
specious justification of the functions of the two agencies.
The section on Censorship, written by·
decidedly the better half'.

B~;rr.·on

Price, is
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